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Crossing the Line: Issues Facing
Entertainment Attorneys Engaged in
Related Secondary Occupations
by DONNA G. COLE-WALLEN*
I
Introduction
Entertainment law1 has become an increasingly popular area
of legal practice in recent years.2 Many factors account for this
popularity. First, there has been remarkable growth and
change during the last twenty years within the music3 and en-
tertainment 4 industries. Second, the entertainment industry
has been recognized as a legitimate and increasingly complex
commercial industry5 which has created a greater need for
legal expertise.' Third, entertainment law is seen as a lucrative
* B.A., Stanford University, 1983; J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1986. The
author is currently assiociated with the law firm of Shea & Gould in Los Angeles,
California.
1. The term "entertainment law," as used in this commentary, refers to the prac-
tice of law in all fields of entertainment and the various industries connected there-
with, including the music, motion picture, radio and television industries. Where
indicated the sports industry will also be included.
2. This can be seen from the apparent rise in the number of law firms initiating
entertainment departments, the demand in law schools to add courses on entertain-
ment law, and the influx of written materials on the subject.
3. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC XIX (2d ed. 1977).
"The growth of the music industry in the past twenty years has in much of that period
far outstripped the increase in the gross national product of the country as a whole."
4. Jossen, Fiduciary Aspects of the Personal Manager's Relationship with a Per-
forming Artist, 11 PERF. ARTS REV. 108, 108 (1981).
5. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 1.01 (1983). "Entertainment
is a commercial industry with intellectual property as its base." The general view is
that the entertainment industry has only recently become a legitimate commercial
venture, although book publishing and movie production have existed far beyond re-
cent history. Lecture by Neil Boorstyn, Adjunct Professor and Practitioner, Hastings
College of the Law, San Francisco (Jan. 11, 1985).
6. Halloran, Music Attorneys, in THE MUSICIANS MANUAL: A PRACTICAL CA-
REER GUIDE 126 (M. Halloran ed. 1979).
Most attorneys, like most doctors, specialize in particular fields of practice.
As with doctors, the primary reason for specialization is the complexity of
the problems that confront the professional. The law is far too complex for a
lawyer to have adequate competence in all legal areas. A specialist, at least
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business endeavor where often a mere phone call can consum-
mate a million dollar deal.' Fourth, many attorneys are frus-
trated artists who, knowing of the difficulty of entry into the
entertainment world, have sidestepped into the business side of
the entertainment field rather than sacrifice their creative in-
terests entirely.8
The effect of these developments has been pronounced. The
popularity of entertainment law has inevitably led many en-
tertainment attorneys to enter into non-legal activities and to
perform roles beyond traditional legal representation. It is no
longer a rarity to find an entertainment attorney who has a re-
lated secondary occupation.9 This should come as no surprise
when one considers the number of attorneys entering the mar-
ket, and the increased focus within law firms on client develop-
ment.1" Thus, both social and economic constraints seem to be
pushing attorneys into the business side of the entertainment
world.
The basic nature of the legal practice is also changing. En-
tertainment attorneys are offering more than the traditional
legal services to their artist clients. Artists' no longer use an
attorney solely to draft or approve contracts; athletes now use
in theory, can do a better job for his client because of his acquired experience
in a particular area. In recent years, due to the growth and complexity of the
entertainment field, a new specialty has arisen among lawyers - "entertain-
ment" lawyers.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the "inordinate amount of time entertain-
ment attorneys spend on the phone." Interview with Bruce Rosenblum, Associate of
Dern, Mason & Floum, Los Angeles (Nov. 1, 1984).
8. This suggestion is evidenced by the many attorneys heading studios, working
for talent agencies, managing artists, negotiating contracts, etc. Griesbaum, En-
tertainment and Legal Forum, 1 NITE LIFE REVUE at 3 (1979).
9. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text (examples of dual occupations).
10. Client development is often referred to as "rainmaking," a term used to mean
creating business and bringing new clients to the firm. The fact that firms have recog-
nized the need for firm members to perform this function seems to reflect the view
within the legal community, both academic and practicing, that a transition is taking
place from the attorney as "professional" to the attorney as "businessman."
11. The terms "artist(s)" and "entertainer(s)" are used interchangeably in this
commentary. The Talent Agent Act defines "artists" as:
[A]ctors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage and in the
production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organiza-
tions, directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, mu-
sical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers,
and other artists and persons rendering professional services in motion pic-
ture, theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment enterprises.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1983).
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attorneys to negotiate multi-million dollar contracts,'12 and nov-
ice musicians send tapes of their work to known music attor-
neys, hoping they will listen to the music and recommend it to
a recording studio.13 Attorneys may even attend concerts look-
ing for new groups that need representation. 4 Artists may
even fire their agents and personal managers, only to replace
them with attorneys and business managers.
Faced with an increased demand for services outside the
traditional legal role and various market pressures, it is not
surprising that many attorneys have entered into secondary oc-
cupations within the entertainment industry. 5 However, with
these changes also come problems. This trend and the nature
of entertainment law raise questions as to how entertainment
attorneys differ from other practitioners and the extent to
which they should be regulated in their dual or multiple occu-
pations. For example, if an attorney handles other non-legal
business matters for an entertainer, has he entered into a dual
occupation? How do statutes, administrative regulations, in-
dustry regulations and trade standards affect the practice of en-
tertainment law? May the attorney ethically participate in the
many economic and artistic endeavors to which he may be ex-
posed? What happens to the traditional attorney-client rela-
tionship once an attorney expands his representation to include
involvement in his client's business transactions?
Bar Association Rules and Codes16 already dictate an attor-
12. Leigh Steinberg, attorney-athletic agent, currently has more than 50 football
players as clients and, since June, 1983, six Steinberg sports clients have signed con-
tracts negotiated by Steinberg worth a total of $57 million. Caroll, Agent to the Stars
of Field and Tube, S. F. Chron., Jan. 9, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
13. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, ABA FORUM COMMITTEE ON THE
ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS INDUSTRIES (Nov. 12, 1983) (address by Jay Cooper, Se-
nior Partner of Cooper, Epstein & Hurewitz, Beverly Hills).
14. Panel Discussion; Personal Representation in the Entertainment and Sports
Industries, CoMM/ENT SYMPOSIUM ON ENTERTAINMENT LAW (Jan. 26, 1985) (Lionel
Sobel, Associate Professor Loyola School of Law, Los Angeles).
15. Jossen, supra note 4, at 117. "It is not uncommon today to find attorneys shift-
ing from private practice to an executive position in the entertainment industry and
vice-versa. In fact, attorneys often give up the practice of law to become writers, pro-
ducers, directors, theatrical or literary agents or personal managers." Id. See Gries-
baum, Entertainment and Legal Forum, 1 NITE LIFE REVUE at 3 (1979); see also
Mendelsohn, Attorneys: Life in the Rock World, L. A. Times, Nov. 11, 1979 (Calen-
dar) at 90, col. 3.
16. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), [hereinafter MODEL
RULES], the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1986) [hereinafter
CODE]. Additionally, there are various state professional responsibility codes and
rules which will be referred to in formal and informal opinions. See infra note 81.
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ney's behavior with respect to legal counseling, and include
rules concerning confidentiality, solicitation, fiduciary duty,
and conflict of interest. State law and union regulations regu-
late the practices of talent agents.17 This commentary exam-
ines the duties, regulations and forces that affect an attorney
who "crosses the line" and performs the dual role of legal advi-
sor and personal business advisor to an artist. Section two dis-
cusses the nature of the entertainment industry and describes
the specific secondary occupations of the talent agent and the
personal manager. Section three addresses the limitations
placed on attorney-agents and attorney-managers. It focuses on
the parameters set by the American Bar Association, particu-
larly with respect to the extent to which an attorney can con-
duct a secondary occupation. Section four examines the state
statutes, union guidelines and trade standards that regulate the
secondary occupations of talent agents or personal managers.
Finally, section five concludes that the performance of multiple
roles may be beneficial to entertainers and suggests solutions to
ensure that such roles are performed harmoniously. It also ad-




Attorneys are an integral part of the entertainment industry.
They aid the artist in protecting his art, and advance the inter-
ests of recording companies, motion picture studios and the nu-
merous other business entities. Attorneys, together with talent
agents and personal managers, act as liaisons between artists
and businesses. This section will argue that many of the serv-
ices attorneys provide overlap with the services provided by
agents and managers. When the overlap reaches the point that
an attorney can be considered to have acquired a secondary oc-
cupation the numerous constraints described in section three
this note limit the dual-occupation attorney.'8
17. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-47 (West 1971 and Supp. 1986). Although the
laws do not expressly regulate the behavior of personal managers, they do inferen-
tially regulate their conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 152-251.
18. See infra notes 70-151 and accompanying text.
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A. The Role of Personal Representatives in the
Entertainment Industry
The entertainment industry, like any other transactional
business, is comprised of profit-seeking companies. However,
in practice, the entertainment world has its own unique cus-
toms and procedures for transacting business.' 9 It embodies an
extremely diverse cast of characters who are generally in tough
competition for artists, artistic product, and money. While art-
ists create the product, the rest of the industry hopes to turn
the product into a financial gain. This note focuses primarily
on those persons involved in the personal representation 20 of an
artist.
Because the entertainment industry is as much a business as
it is a forum for communication, the professional artist gener-
ally needs to utilize the services of specialists and profession-
als,21 including personal managers, 22 talent agents,23 business
managers, 24 and attorneys.25 The successful artist will usually
have a number of these specialized "middlemen" to aid him in
marketing and protecting his art or talent.
Traditionally, each of these specialists has served a different
facet of the artist's career. Today, however, the imperatives of
the business have caused many specialists to expand their serv-
ices to cover several facets of an artist's career. First, artists
may find it less costly and more expedient to have fewer mid-
dlemen to perform the needed services.26 Second, the current
19. See T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 5 at 1-1 (discussion of the entertain-
ment industry's similarities and differences to other commercial industries); see also
Simensky, Defining Entertainment Law, 4 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 13 (1986).
20. The phrase "personal representative" used herein encompasses professional
and business representatives in the entertainment and sports industries.
21. Johnson, The Business Side of the Artist's Career, in THE MUSICIAN'S MAN-
UAL: A PRACTICAL CAREER GUIDE 78 (M. Halloran ed. 1979); see also Gershon, Coun-
seling Entertainers, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE PERFORMING ARTS 9 (1975).
The performing artist, sports figure, or entertainer generally has a large
number of people in his retinue who render advice, guidance and counsel,
and they almost always have at least an agent and/or general manager. The
underlying purpose of these various relationships is to allow and help an art-
ist to perform, create and pursue whatever his profession is and enable him
to accomplish the fullest commercial and artistic development of his career.
Id. at 16.
22. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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complexity of the entertainment business requires greater
skills from each representative, which, once acquired, give a
representative the ability to offer a greater range of services."
Third, due to the concentration of the entertainment business
within two geographic areas (New York City and Los Angeles),
a representative with many contacts may find his services in
high demand in many capacities and for several different cli-
ents. Fourth, a new artist, fortunate enough to obtain one kind
of representation, may be unable to procure separate represen-
tation in all areas.2 Finally, where personal representatives
continue to separate their duties and responsibilities, there may
be gray areas where an artist's problems overlap.29 To better
understand the potential for overlap and the trend toward cen-
tralization of representation, it is helpful to examine the vari-
ous services performed by personal representatives.
1. The Personal Manager
The first specialist with whom an artist generally comes in
contact is the personal manager. The relationship between art-
ist and personal manager often begins before the artist has
achieved formal public recognition.30 The personal manager
advises, counsels, and directs the entertainer in the develop-
27. Questions and Answers About Agents, Managers and Lawyers from the Sym-
posium Transcripts, in THE ACTOR'S MANUAL: A PRACTICAL CAREER GUIDE 48 (1978)
[hereinafter Questions and Answers].
28. See id. at 47. "Talent agencies, particularly the larger ones, have a huge client
list. The lesser names tend to hover at the bottom of the list. They do not produce
enough revenue for the agency and the agents are too busy with their name clients."
Id. (Statement by Howard West). See generally Note, The Personal Manager in Cali-
fornia: Riding the Horns of the Licensing Dilemma, 1 COMM/ENT L.J. 347 (1978);
Licensing & Regulation of Artist Managers, Personal Managers and Musicians Book-
ing Agencies: Hearings Before the California Legislature Senate Committee on In-
dustrial Relations (1975) [hereinafter Hearings].
29. For example, both a business manager (possibly an accountant) handling fi-
nancial investments and a tax attorney may be able to make suggestions for the best
tax incentives for a contract. See generally Levy & Sprague, Accounting and Law: Is
Dual Practice in the Public Interest? 52 A.B.A. J. 1110 (1966). Also, a personal man-
ager may perform some of the functions traditionally associated with talent agents;
for example, talent agencies and personal managers both "advise and counsel an artist
in the development of their professional careers." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West
Supp. 1986). In general, "[tihe functions that each of the professions (agent, manager,
lawyer, accountant) perform overlap to some extent and are being performed some-
times in combination by one person .... It's hard to keep the functions completely
distinct .... ." Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 48 (statement by Eric
Weissman).
30. Note, supra note 28, at 347; see also Hearings, supra note 28, at 40 ("[Agencies]
very often do not sign [artists] until they have a record .... Personal managers.., are
[Vol. 8
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ment, advancement, and enhancement of his artistic career."
Thus, the personal manager runs the artist's personal affairs
(and sometimes business affairs), while the entertainer concen-
trates on his art. 2 The personal manager usually educates his
client about the general practices of the entertainment industry
and helps the client select other persons who can provide addi-
tional advice and help procure employment.33 If the artist does
not have a separate road manager or business manager, tasks
such as making travel arrangements, hiring extra personnel,
and handling expenses may be performed by the personal man-
ager.3 4 Ultimately, the personal manager acts as the artist's al-
ter ego. He essentially coordinates the activities of the artist
with those persons who function in various areas for, and on
behalf of, the artist, such as talent agents, business managers,
public relations personnel, accountants and attorneys.35
Neither formal training nor licensing is required to become a
personal manager. In the recording industry, at least in the ini-
tial stages of an artist's career, the personal manager may be a
friend who is willing to invest the time and money to help the
artist get a recording contract. 6 A personal manager may be an
in the business of developing talent from its ... genesis." (statement by Roger Davis
of the William Morris Agency, Los Angeles).
31. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 21, at 78; Thaler & Joseph, Personal Managers
- Their Legal Status and Problems 1, in CURRENT LEGAL TRENDS AND DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS INDUSTRIES, ABA FORUM COMM. ON EN-
TERTAINMENT AND SPORTS INDUSTRIES (D. Lange ed. 1979) (materials from
symposium, Mar. 9-10, 1979).
32. Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 48. "The personal manager babysits
.... [T]he artist may depend on the manager for emotional support and for the resolu-
tion of conflicts." Hearings, supra note 28, at 159 (statement by Joe Smith, President,
Warner Brothers Record Co.). See also Note, The Plight of the Personal Manager in
California: A Legislative Solution, 6 COMM/ENT L.J. 837, 837 (1984).
33. Note, supra note 32, at 837.
34. Hearings, supra note 28, at 171, 172 (statement by Arnold Mills, President,
Conference of Personal Managers West).
35. Thaler & Joseph, supra note 31, at 1. The personal manager's role was not as
great during the origins of the entertainment industry. However, "[t]he complexity of
the business aspects accompanying this growth has created a need for a liaison be-
tween the performing artist and the attorneys, accountants, agents and promoters
with whom the artist would otherwise have to deal directly." Jossen, supra note 4, at
108-09.
36. Note, supra note 28, at 347. The personal manager's role in the theatrical in-
dustry may not begin until the actor's career is more established. Although the per-
sonal manager will still act as chief coordinator of the business manager, attorney,
publicist and agent, his role in career development is minute compared to that of a
personal manager in the recording industry. See Questions and Answers, supra note
27, at 43.
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attorney, accountant or other business person37 who uses his
contacts, experience, and knowledge to develop an artist's ca-
reer.38 A personal manager may also be engaged in music pub-
lishing, record production, house booking, and various other
business activities throughout the entertainment industry.39
Although there are no formal prerequisites, a successful per-
sonal manager must have a thorough understanding of the
structure and intricacies of the entire spectrum of the en-
tertainment industry.4 °
At present, there is no direct statutory regulation of personal
managers; instead the limitations arise inferentially from legis-
lative and union regulations governing talent agents.41 For ex-
ample, a personal manager may neither solicit nor procure
employment for the artist unless he is also a licensed talent
agent.42
2. The Talent Agent
43
A talent agency is a "person or corporation who engages in
the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting
to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists.
Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the
development of their professional careers. '44 To be a "talent
37. Reed, Personal Managers, in THE MUSICIAN'S MANUAL: A PRACTICAL CA-
REER GUIDE 82, 83 (M. Halloran ed. 1979).
38. Hearings, supra note 28, at 137. A personal manager may have as few as two
to five clients. (statement by Walter L.M. Lorimer, Attorney, Loeb & Loeb, Los An-
geles; representing Independent Personal Managers).
39. Hearings, supra note 28, at 149-50 (statement by Howard L. Thaler, Legal
Counsel, Conference of Personal Managers).
40. Reed, supra note 37, at 83.
41. See infra notes 163-213 and accompanying text.
42. Numerous articles, cases, and commentary in recent years have focused on a
personal manager's proscription from procuring engagements for an artist. See, e.g.,
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967); Johnson &
Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment Industry, 52 So. CAL.
L. REV. 375 (1979); Note, supra note 28; Note, supra note 32; Hearings, supra note 28.
The degree and type of prohibition is treated differently in California or New York.
In California the issue remains unresolved. See infra notes 163-93 (California) and
notes 194-201 (New York).
43. The term "talent agent" as used herein includes agents, entertainment agents,
theatrical booking agents, artists managers, etc.
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West Supp. 1986) (This definition excludes the
recording contract incidental exemption active from 1983-1986); N.Y. ARTS & CULT.
AFF. LAW § 37.01(3) (McKinney 1983). The talent agent equivalent in New York is
defined as: "Theatrical employment agency" means any person who procures or at-
tempts to procure employment or engagements for circus, vaudeville, the variety
field, the legitimate theater, motion pictures, radio, television, phonograph recordings,
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agent," an individual must be licensed,45 and must agree to fol-
low the entertainment union's franchising rules with respect to
terms of contracts, fees, and length of service.46
Although the duties of a personal manager and a talent agent
overlap to some extent, the primary duty of a talent agent is to
obtain employment for the artist he represents.47 Unlike the
personal manager who generally works independently for his
artist-clients, a talent agent usually practices within the con-
fines of a large or medium-sized agency.
The advent of the large agency 48 has resulted in both benefits
and liabilities for the artist. On the one hand, many of the big
agencies are departmentalized, thereby permitting agents to
specialize in a particular field such as motion picture, legitimate
theatre, appearances, television, independent studios, game and
panel shows, recording companies, or concert touring.49 The
big agency can help the artist who has a specific area of interest
or expertise because the artist's agent will be a specialist with
particularized contacts and resources most suited to the artist's
particular needs. On the other hand, the client may get "lost in
the shuffle. '50 The talent agent's attention to day-to-day career
demands and problems of clients may be minimal.5 ' In addi-
transcriptions, opera, concert, ballet, modeling, or other entertainments, or exhibi-
tions, or performances .... " Id.
45. See infra notes 163-201 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
47. Johnson, supra note 21, at 80. The degree of duplication will vary according to
the needs of the artist. "The agent is a business finder and negotiator, whether as a
booking agent for concert halls or college circuit tours... or as a general marketer of
individual or a packaged talent, such as ... International Creative Management or the
William Morris Agency, Inc." S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 71. "If
the talent agent did for each act what a personal manager does, he would not have
time to get his work done" because "[at] least 85% of the talent agent's time is spent
searching for employment." Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 378 n.19. See also
Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 43.
48. The two biggest agencies are International Creative Management ("ICM")
with approximately 2,300 clients and offices in New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas,
Miami, London, and Paris, and The William Morris Agency, Inc. with approximately
2,500 clients with offices in New York, Beverly Hills, Chicago, Nashville, London,
Rome, Munich, and Paris. For a discussion of the historical development of talent
agencies, see Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 376-80.
49. 3 A. LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS; AGREE-
MENTS AND THE LAW 1737-38 (2d ed. 1982); Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at
43.
50. When this happens the personal manager will have the responsibility "to coor-
dinate the various agents and see to it that his client is receiving proper coverage in
the marketplace ...." Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 48.
51. Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 378.
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tion, a young artist may be unable to find an agent willing to
work for him because the artist is not yet able to meet the
"norms of profitability. 52
3. The Business Manager
Business managers collect and disburse funds, perform rou-
tine bookkeeping and accounting functions, manage invest-
ments and keep a close watch over the tax consequences of an
artist's business affairs. 3 Usually, business managers are ac-
countants and lawyers,54 and as such are regulated by the pro-
fessional associations governing those occupations. The
personal manager will often perform business management
functions for an artist until the artist is able to afford the costs
of an additional personal representative.
4. The Entertainment Attorney
The role of an entertainment attorney is not necessarily dif-
ferent from the role played by the attorney in any other busi-
ness setting. "Entertainment law, like any other type of
commercial law, is a combination of legal principles and busi-
ness practices." 5 With the possible exception of understanding
the intricacies of the copyright laws, the problems most crea-
tive artists face are not really unique in a legal sense. They fall
within standard legal categories such as contract, labor rela-
tions, real estate, taxation, and torts.56 What makes the en-
tertainment attorney's role most challenging and interesting is
that these legal problems generally arise in an emotionally
charged, creative setting.5 7 Entertainment clients may be unso-
phisticated about business and may resent the intrusion of busi-
ness reality into the personal aspects of creation. Thus, an
entertainment attorney must be able to serve the artist's busi-
ness needs and respond to the artist's enthusiasm about
52. Id. at 382. "In the music business, 'the agency runs at a loss with an artist
until that artist is making $7,500 per night.' ") (Interview with Bob Ring, agent with
William Morris Agency, (Sept. 6, 1978) reprinted in Johnson & Lang, supra note 42,
at 382 n.37). See also Questions and Answers, supra note 27.
53. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 73.
54. Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 51.
55. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 5, at 1-1.
56. Engler, Lawyers for the Creative Arts, 7 UPDATE ON LAW - REL. EDUC. 50
(Winter 1983).
57. Panel DiscussionLegal Aspects of Personal Representation, COMM/ENT EN-
TERTAINMENT LAW SYMPOSIUM (Jan. 26, 1985) (statement by Penny Semple Von Boz-
zay, Attorney at Law, San Francisco) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
[Vol. 8
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projects and emotional attitude about disputes.5 8
The purely legal functions of an entertainment attorney can
be divided into two areas: the artist's career and the artist's
personal matters. 9 Although contract negotiation comprises
the largest portion of work that an attorney will perform for an
artist, perhaps the most significant service the attorney per-
forms is protecting the artist's interests in his artistic product
from profit-seeking companies and other representatives. Be-
cause, as discussed below, an attorney is subject to higher fidu-
ciary standards than a personal manager or talent agent,60 he
58. Id.
59. For example:
[A]s far as the career of an actor or actress is concerned, a lawyer's function
goes through a number of different stages. A lawyer will read your contract
if you get an offer from a studio for you to star in a movie. He will discuss
that contract with the agent to make sure the contract conforms to the deal
and then will try to improve on the form presented by the other side ....
Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 49.
The attorney may also prepare other contracts the artist may need, such as the agency
or personal management contract. If disputes arise out of employment, terms or re-
ceipts, the attorney will most likely represent the artist in any ensuing litigation. On
the personal side, the artist may use the attorney's services for other legal problems,
such as personal injury, marital disputes and investment transactions. Outside the
legal arena, the attorney may also give personal advice to the artist about business
practices and career development.
60. One of the best examples of the extremely high fiduciary standard imposed on
an attorney can be seen in Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in
part 737 F.2d 229 (2d. Cir. 1984). Croce involved the signing and performance of three
recording, management and publishing contracts between Jim and Ingrid Croce,
Tommy West, Terry Cashman (both producers and owners of C.P.& W., a recording
company) and Philip Kurnit (attorney for West and Cashman, and also president,
director and shareholder of various recording industry companies affiliated with
C.P.& W). During a series of transactions during 1968, the Croces were not repre-
sented by independent legal counsel and were not advised to retain counsel by Kurnit,
who signed the contracts he had drafted on behalf of C.P.& W. Defendants' Reply
Brief at 7, Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
At trial, the court addressed several issues with respect to conflict of interest and
breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the fiduciary duty charges against Cash-
man and West who acted as managers and producers for the Croces and held that
absent fraud and gross unfairness, Cashman and West could not be held to have
breached a fiduciary duty. 565 F. Supp. at 893. Kurnit, as an attorney, did not fare so
well. With respect to Kurnit's breach, the court stated:
Even in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, however, a
lawyer may owe a fiduciary obligation to any persons with whom he deals. In
particular, a fiduciary duty arises when a lawyer deals with persons who,
although not strictly his clients, he has or should have reason to believe and
rely on him.
Id. at 890 (citations omitted). Having established that Kurnit owed a fiduciary obliga-
tion to the Croces, the court focused on Kurnit's breach of the duty through his fail-
ure to advise the Croces to obtain outside counsel. The court held:
No. 3/4]
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must act as both an independent advisor and a "watch dog" for
his artist-clients.61
5. Attorney Overlap Into Other Areas of Personal
Representation
Entertainment attorneys range from those who advise artists
on individual problems to those who manage every aspect of
their clients' legal and business affairs. 62 The former confine
their representation to those areas where legal advice is
needed; the latter become so involved in the affairs of their cli-
ents that they either inadvertently or purposely cross the line
into the other areas of artist representation. 63 The latter cate-
gory is the focus of this note.
The transition from performing purely legal services to per-
forming other representative tasks often occurs during contract
negotiations. Even when the personal manager or agent is in-
strumental in procuring the deal, the attorney has a substantial
legal role in clarifying the negotiated terms of the contract.
Often legal training and experience are so important in coping
with the complex rights and responsibilities peculiar to the var-
ious entertainment areas, that it is advisable for the entertain-
ment attorney to actually negotiate the contract.64 In fact, the
Kurnit's introduction as "the lawyer," his explanation to the Croces of the
"legal ramifications" of the contracts which contained a number of legal
terms and concepts, his interest as a principal in the transactions, his failure
to advise the Croces to obtain outside counsel, and the Croces lack of in-
dependent representation, taken together establish both a fiduciary duty on
the part of Kurnit and a breach of that duty.
565 F. Supp. at 890. See also Jossen, supra note 4, at 117-20.
61. An attorney has a duty of loyalty and while dealing with an artist's other rep-
resentatives, he should ensure that they too are acting in the artist client's best inter-
ests. See generally Levy & Sprague, supra note 29, at 1113.
62. See Engler, supra note 56, at 50.
63. Some of the circumstances that frequently exist at the early stages of [the
attorney-client] relationship include:
(1) the manager-attorney relationship with the artist, solely as his attorney;
(2) the manager attorney representing the artist as his attorney in dealing
with others;
(3) the "marriage" - the assumption of management responsibilities by the
attorney-manager.
Biehl, Tracing the Relationship of Artist and Management to Demonstrate the Many
Sources of Litigation, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE PERFORMING ARTS 583 (1975)
restated in Jossen, supra note 35, at 124 n.110.
64. Making the deal is thought to be the job of the agent and the agent's impor-
tance in this area has grown with the increasing complexity of big money deals and
changing conditions. In response to the legal and tax problems involved substantial
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complexity of contract negotiation may lead the attorney to be-
lieve that the talent agent and personal manager are inade-
quate for the job. Thus, the attorney may expand his role and
eliminate the need for other representatives.65
Even more common is the inadvertent performance of per-
sonal manager or talent agent functions by the attorney. The
managerial function of advising and counseling artists in their
careers in inextricably bound with problems of law and con-
tracts.66 Sometimes attorneys gravitate into the managerial
functions because there are gray areas between legal advice
(the attorney's function) and career advice (the personal man-
ager's function). In some cases, attorneys may even elect to ex-
clusively perform managerial functions.67
Many commentators suggest that the balance of representa-
tion is upset when the attorney expands his services into other
areas of personal representation. 6  By usurping the roles of
agent and personal manager, the attorney may actually be
transactions, attorneys in some instances have moved in. See S. SHEMEL & W.
KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 78; 3 A. LINDEY, supra note 49, at 1737.
65. The problem is that, though our functions are allied, they are also com-
petitive .... A business manager, an agent, a personal manager, a lawyer,
working in concert can do wonders, even if they duplicate each other's func-
tions, as long as each person is confident that the others are not going to try
and undermine him to get a closer position with the client.
Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 49.
66. The Code does not limit an attorney to giving solely legal advice, but also al-
lows moral, economic, social and political advice where it is relevant to a client's situa-
tion. ABA CODE supra note 16, EC 7-8; MODEL RULES 2.1. See also 1 J. TAUBMAN,
PERFORMING ARTS MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW 47-48 (1972); Jossen, supra note 4, at
117.
67. The time commitment required to perform the counseling and advising func-
tions of a personal manager is demanding. Supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
Thus, an attorney who prefers the advising and counseling aspect of his legal function
over the advocacy aspect may choose to engage in an area of the entertainment indus-
try where he may perform those services full time.
68. Panel Discussion, supra note 57. "A lot of attorneys do take on dual roles, but
the value of a professional agent may be greater than you think." Id. (Lionel Sobel,
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles). "An artist needs an
agent. An attorney should work in conjunction with an agent or personal manager.
Let the agent or personal manager sell the deal and as an attorney, you can police the
deal." (Donald Engel, Partner, Engel & Engel, Los Angeles). For example:
A lawyer is in a position to do things that agents often cannot. They can
afford to be tougher because they don't depend on the ongoing relationships
with publishers. They can be sons of bitches. They can go out for the fast
buck. An agent, who may have to sell to the same publisher next week a
five-thousand dollar advance book instead of a multi-million dollar advance
book, can't afford to do that.
Berstein, Get Me a Lawyer! 1979 WRITER'S YEARBOOK 76.
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working to the detriment of his client because he is an active
participant and no longer an impartial advisor "policing" the
deal.69 These commentators posit that the most desirable ar-
rangement for the artist is one in which the artist is repre-
sented by a legal expert in addition to a well organized team
comprised of an agent, personal manager, and accountant.7 °
This "team approach" is designed to assess which services are
required in a given situation, thus minimizing duplication of
tasks.7 1 Even among commentators who have adopted this
view, there is some recognition that situations exist where an
attorney is the best person to perform multiple roles. This can
occur, for example, in situations where the attorney is the most
skilled person available; 72 where the efforts of one individual
represent the most effective method of handling business;73
where, in the context of certain fields, such as sports, the ath-
lete usually has only one personal representative; 74 or, lastly,
where the attorney-agent may be the one most likely to act in
the best interest of this client.
If an attorney begins to perform the advisorial, counseling,
and negotiation services of a talent agent or personal manager,
it is only logical that the attorney may wish to expand his role
further. Over time, the attorney may gain a reputation as an
69. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Lionel Sobel and Donald Engel).
70. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 78; for example:
A presumption exists that if an artist has a lawyer who knows all of the ins
and outs of the industry, knows all of the clauses, the contracts, knows the
studio executives, that [there is no need] to pay an agent 10%... But, for that
10% the agent gets up every morning and hits the street... An attorney can
do a marvelous job, and many do, but they're not visiting the studios, all day
every day.
Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 50.
71. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 50.
72. E.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 57. "[If an attorney has the contacts, un-
derstands the business of acting as agent, and has the time to make the contacts, the
client may be in the best hands with the attorney [acting as agent]. As long as the
attorney can provide the skills, he or she may be providing good services." Id. (Von
Bozzay, Attorney at Law, San Francisco). "If there is no one more expert than you as
an agent, even though you're an attorney, there may be no need to refer the client to
an agent." Id. (Donald Engel).
73. Panel Discussion, supra note 57. "In an unbifurcated field like television and
radio where the clients are seeking jobs as anchor people, broadcasters, etc., the sys-
tem is different. Only one person solicits jobs and represents the media personality
because this is the only way to be effective, and an attorney's expertise is important."
Id. (Leigh Steinberg, Sports Attorney-Athlete's Agent, Berkeley, CA.).
74. For an excellent discussion of the agent-athlete relationship, see Comment,
The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professional and Amateur Sports: The Inherent
Potential for Abuse and the Need for Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 815 (1981).
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active participant in his clients' careers by negotiating deals and
giving career advice. Through this representation, the attorney
will develop relationships with individuals and companies in
the industry. His knowledge of the entertainment business
may induce him to accept clients in the early stages of their
careers because he believes they have talent and are potentially
successful.75 The attorney may find that his recommendations
are sometimes successful in obtaining a contract. 76 The attor-
ney may actively solicit deals for his clients. Some attorneys in
the music industry distribute demo tapes for their clients.
77
Eventually, the attorney may find himself performing a variety
of services that are beneficial to all phases of his clients' ca-
reers.7' However, once this happens, he can no longer claim
that he is only acting as a legal counsel. This transition having
occurred, the attorney has entered into dual or multiple
occupations.
III
Regulation of the Attorney in His Legal Practice
and Secondary Occupation
This section examines the regulation of attorneys acting in
their primary occupation as legal counsel and in their secon-
dary occupation as talent agent/personal manager.79 It defines
attorneys' duties and the limitations placed on their behavior,
and then focuses on the issue of dual occupations 80 and the ex-
75. Hearings, supra note 28, at 41.
76. Halloran, Music Attorneys, in THE MUSICIAN'S MANUAL: A PRACTICAL CA-
REER GUIDE 126, 127 (M. Halloran ed. 1979).
77. Id. "Demo tapes" is the short term for demonstration tapes made by artists
which contain a sampling of what the artist feels are the best songs he performs.
78. For example, John Mason and J. Owen Sloane, attorneys representing ABBA,
Frank Zappa, Cat Stevens, Stevie Nicks, Lindsey Buckingham, and Little River Band,
when asked about the most important service provided to a client, replied:
If one of our clients can maintain success for a couple of years .... we'll
establish them in business to the extent that they'll be able to function for
the rest of their lives without another hit record. I'm very proud of the fact
that we don't have a single client whom we haven't helped to make wealthy
by means independent of their music during the years of their success.
Mendelsohn, Attorneys: Life in the Rock World, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11, 1979
(Calendar) at 91, col. 2.
79. Section II discusses the general concepts relating to attorneys in dual occupa-
tions. The remainder of this note focuses more specifically on attorney-agents and
attorney-managers.
80. Due to the dearth of material on the ethical constraints placed upon an attor-
ney-agent or attorney-manager (as found in ABA Formal Opinions, Informal Opin-
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isting ethical constraints"1 placed on an attorney choosing to
have a secondary occupation.
A. The Role of a Lawyer
A lawyer's professional activities fall roughly into three cate-
gories: (1) consulting clients; (2) drafting and negotiating legal
instruments; and (3) representing clients before the courts.
8 2
Because the lawyer performs so many functions, there exists
the possibility that his various responsibilities may come into
conflict. In order to help the lawyer uphold his status as an
officer of the court, representative, and public citizen, and to
further define his role, the bar associations have for many years
provided guidelines with respect to attorney conduct.8 3 The
main thrust of these guidelines is that the lawyer's conduct
"should conform to the requirements of the law, both in profes-
sional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and per-
sonal affairs. '$4  Some commentators have criticized the
guidelines as being too strict and have suggested that the con-
straints placed on an attorney border on proscription of consti-
tutionally protected conduct, especially in the area of dual
occupation.85 However, it is generally accepted that voluntary
ions, case law or law review articles), this section will examine other occupations
which are by analogy pertinent to the intended focus.
81. The rules that govern attorney conduct stem from a variety of sources: stat-
utes, case law, rules of court, and ethics rules. Every state has a body of professional
ethics rules that govern the conduct of lawyers. In all but a few states, these ethics
rules are closely patterned after models created by the ABA. All discussion of ethical
rules will refer to the Code, except where indicated. The proposed Model Rules will
be addressed only where they deviate from the Code, because: (1) the ABA Code has
been adopted by most states; (2) California and New York rules are based on the
Code; and (3) most of the available case law and ABA ethics opinions refer to the
Code. See generally State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1983-71 (1983) (for Code effect in California).
82. Halloran, Music Attorneys, in THE MUSICIAN'S MANUAL: A PRACTICAL CA-
REER GUIDE at 126 (M. Halloran ed. 1979). See also, Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional Relations, 56 A.B.A. J. 776, 778 (1970)
("[T]he lawyer has been the business and personal advisor.., not only when [clients]
are already in trouble, but much more often when they seek guidance to handle trans-
actions properly and to keep out of trouble").
83. For a discussion of the history of the rules of professional responsibility, see
Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804-05 (1982).
84. CODE, supra note 16, Preamble. MODEL, RULES, supra note 16, Preamble. It
is through this conformity that the governance of dual occupation arises.
85. See Mintz, Accountancy and Law: Should Dual Practice be Proscribed?, 53
A.B.A. J. 225, 226 (1967) ("To practice a profession by those qualified is a right pro-
tected by the United States Constitution subject to reasonable regulation by appropri-
ate legal bodies").
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entry into the legal profession subjects an attorney to the self-
regulation of bar associations.86
The most significant body of rules affecting the lawyer is the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility,
which dictates an attorney's conduct in many areas. The Code
sections that are germane to the issue of dual occupation regu-
late the attorney-client relationship, fees, conflicts-of-interest,
professional independence, and information about legal serv-
ices, advertising and solicitation. 7
86. Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 917, 924 (1976).
87. CODE, supra note 16, Disciplinary Rules (DRs).
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of
any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by
potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, sub-
ject to DR 2-103, the following information in print media distributed over
television or radio broadcast in the geographic area or areas in which the
lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the law-
yer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer
in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented
in a dignified manner:
(1) Name .... ;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices ....
to the extent authorized under DR 2-105;
(H) This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a law-
yer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional status is germane to
the political campaign or to a political issue.
(2) In public notices when the name and profession of a lawyer are re-
quired or authorized by law or are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other
than the attraction of potential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business, civic,
professional, or political organization in which he serves as a director or
officer.
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications, and in
dignified advertisements thereof.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads and Offices.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shal not use or participate in the use of profes-
sional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, or
similar professional notices or devices, except that the following may be used
if they are in dignified form:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a law-
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B. Lawyer in a Dual Profession
1. Can the Attorney Carry on Dual Professions?
Although no disciplinary rule forbids a lawyer from engaging
yer, and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law firm,
and any information permitted under DR 2-105.
(3) A sign on or near the door of the office and in the building directory
identifying the law office. The sign shall not state the nature of the prac-
tice, except as permitted under DR 2-105.
(4) A letterhead of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a lawyer, and
giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law firm, associ-
ates and any information permitted under DR 2-105.
(B) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a
name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing
under such name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one
or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that the name of a professional
corporation or professional assocation may contain "P.C." or "P.A." or simi-
lar symbols indicating the nature of the organization....
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend
employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a
layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or
organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a re-
ward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a
client, except that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged
by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D).
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that
he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former
client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom
the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in
activities designed to educate laypersons to recognize legal problems, to
make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if
such activities are conducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance
organization.
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing
in certain areas of law or as limiting his practice permitted under DR 2-
101(B), except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney,"
"Patent Lawyer," "Registered Patent Attorney," or any combination of
those terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer or
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the law firm practices or states that his practice is limited to one or more
fields of law shall do so by using designations and definitions authorized
and approved by [the agency having jurisdiction of the subject under state
law].
(3) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or
law practice by [the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the
subject of specialization by lawyers] may hold himself out as such, but only
in accordance with the rules prescribed by that authority.
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the
fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the par-
ticular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.
DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Non-Lawyer
(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in
the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected,
but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information nec-
essary to prevent the crime.
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simultaneously in another business, profession, or endeavor, 88
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Im-
pair His Independent Professional Judgment.
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall
not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf
of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, busi-
ness, property, or personal interests.
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingency fee in a civil case.
DR 5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exer-
cise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless
the client has consented after full disclosure.
(B) Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employ-
ment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a
client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication
rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed
employment.
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment If the Interests of
Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the
Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it
would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to
the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may repre-
sent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the in-
terest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independ-
ent professional judgment on behalf of each.
88. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328
(1972). See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 57
(1932), discussed in Continuing Professional Constraints, Current Legal Trends and
Developments in the Entertainment and Sports Industries, ABA FORUM COMM. OF
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constraints on attorney behavior can make it extremely diffi-
cult for a lawyer to actually engage in a secondary occupation
while still conforming to the high standards imposed on him by
the ABA. 89 The disciplinary rules are mandatory and apply
uniformly to all lawyers regardless of the nature of their pro-
fessional activities.9" Dual practice has traditionally been disfa-
vored for a myriad of reasons, 91 and it appears that this disfavor
is, to a certain degree, responsible for the stringent standards
set forth by the code.
With respect to one common dual occupation, attorney-certi-
fied public accountant, some commentators feel that the moti-
vations for dual practice-higher quality service, convenience,
and lower costs to clients-could be outweighed by the argu-
ments against it.92 For example, critics have argued that "[i]t is
too difficult for a lawyer to devote sufficient time to two occu-
pations to keep abreast of current developments."93 Others
ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS INDUSTRIES (D. Lange ed. 1979) (material from Sympo-
sium, Mar. 9-10, 1979).
89. Formal Op. 328, supra note 88.
[A] lawyer may conduct, in compliance with DR 2-102,* his law practice and a
second occupation, not law related from one office; and he may practice from
the same office both as a lawyer and as a member of a law-related profession
or occupation, such as a marriage counselor, accountant, labor relations con-
sultant, real estate broker, or mortgage broker, if he complies ... with all
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility while conducting his
second, law-related occupation.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
* The Code was amended in 1980, with the Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility deleting DR 2-102(E), which read:
A lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession
or business shall not so indicate on his letterhead, office sign, or professional
card, nor shall he identify himself as a lawyer in any publication in connec-
tion with his other profession or business.
CODE supra note 16, DR 2-102(E) (amended 1980). However, DR 2-105, supra note 87,
retains a prohibition about specialization which still gives force to the opinions cited
under DR 2-102(E) when combined with the other Disciplinary Rules on advertising.
Also, most states which originally adopted the Code in toto, have retained their
equivalent to DR 2-102(E).
90. CODE, supra note 16, Preamble; CODE, supra note 16, Preliminary Statement.
See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 203 (1940).
("The Canons of this association govern all its members, irrespective of the nature of
their practice, and the application of the Canons is not affected by statutes or regula-
tions governing certain activities of lawyers which may prescribe less stringent
standards.").
91. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
92. Levy & Sprague, supra note 29, at 1114.
93. Continuing Professional Constraints, supra note 31, at 1; see, e.g., Levy &
Sprague, supra note 29.
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have asserted that "[t]o be well qualified to serve clients as a
lawyer or a C.P.A. is a full-time job, '9 4 and that "the public can-
not be expected to understand or evaluate competence and is
likely to be misled and confused by dual titles. '95 The cost and
convenience factors used to justify dual practice are thus dis-
trusted by opponents of dual practice. Opponents fear that
lower costs and increased convenience might result in dimin-
ished attorney competence.96 The most common argument
against dual practice is that the second occupation really serves
as a "feeder"9 to the law practice98 and thus constitutes "indi-
rect solicitation" which creates an appearance of impropriety
that is inconsistent with a lawyer's duties as a member of the
bar.99 Such solicitation subjects a lay person "to the private im-
portuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal en-
counter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed... and
may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment, and pro-
[M]any lawyers feel that the dual practice of law and accounting is not in the
public interest for these reasons:
First, the official position of the American Bar Association holds it to be
unethical to practice law and accounting at the same time.
Second, it constitutes the representation of a specialty, which is a form of
advertising.
Third, it combines the attributes of loyalty and advocacy with that of
impartiality.
Fourth, it presupposes a degree of competence in two very difficult disci-
plines, which most practitioners would find difficult to attain and maintain.
Levy & Sprague, supra note 29, at 1113.
94. Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional Re-
lations, 56 A.B.A. J. 776, 778.
95. Id. at 779.
96. Levy & Sprague, supra note 29, at 1114-15.
97. Solicitation means client-getting activity that involves personal contact (either
oral or written) between a lawyer and a potential client who has not sought the law-
yer's legal advice. DR 2-104, supra note 87. Indirect solicitation can occur when an
attorney's secondary business "is one that will readily lend itself as a means for pro-
curing professional employment [for the attorney]" in his legal role. ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 57 (1932). When a business serves as
a "feeder", the business is being used as a mechanism to stimulate the need for legal
services.
98. Continuing Professional Constraints, supra note 88, at 2; see also, ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsiblity, Formal Op. 297 (1961); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsiblity, Informal Op. 431 (1961) (lawyer-bank direc-
tor); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 501 (1962)
(lawyer-title insurance agent). See generally, Burke, Dueling over the Dual Practice,
27 MD. L. REV. 142 (1967); Wilson, The Attorney-CPA and the Dual Practice Problem,
36 U. DETROIT L.J. 457 (1959).
99. E.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 57




Determining whether an attorney's dual practice should be
proscribed has traditionally been based on a separation of attor-
ney activities into categories defined as related and unrelated
occupations.'O An unrelated occupation is one in which the
products or services provided by the attorney to the customers
or clients do not involve services which would be essentially
legal in nature.0 2 An unrelated occupation is exemplified by
an attorney's operation of a shopping center, retail store, or
manufacturing enterprise.'0 3 The ABA contends that unre-
lated occupations present less risk of improper or unprofes-
sional conduct than do related occupations primarily because it
is easier for the public to distinguish a lawyer's legal conduct
from his unrelated conduct.
1 0 4
On the other hand, where the secondary occupation is, for
example, that of accountant, collection agent, claims adjuster,
labor relations consultant, business consultant, insurance
agent, marriage counselor, real estate broker, income tax spe-
cialist, or loan or mortgage broker, the lawyer's activity would
likely involve solutions to problems that are essentially legal in
nature, these secondary occupations are considered to be re-
lated.0 5 It is only in a related occupation that the attorney is
100. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 7.3 comment (1983) (based on DR 2-
103(A), supra note 87; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 28 (1908)). The specific
terms "indirect solicitation" and "feeding" were dropped from the rules when the
ABA adopted the Code. Formal Op. 328, supra note 88.
101. See generally Continuing Professional Constraints, supra note 88.
102. See New York State Bar Association Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 206 (1971), reprinted in 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 120 (1972).
103. Id.; Continuing Professional Constraints, supra note 88, at 4. But see ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1497 (1983), reprinted
in ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter LAWYER'S
MANUAL].
The practice of medicine is not generally the practice of a law related profes-
sion, but medical considerations may frequently have a bearing on legal is-
sues such as one's legal capacity, entitlement to insurance proceeds, liability
in a medical malpractice case, or the extent of injury in a personal injury
case. Particularly if the lawyer/physician practices ... from a single office,
the client or patient may not always clearly distinguish between medical and
legal advice where the medical and legal isues are related. The lawyer/physi-
cian should make it clear to the client or patient the capacity in which he or
she is serving.
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra at 801:344.
104. See Formal Op. 206, supra note 102.
105. Id.; Continuing Professional Constraints, supra note 88, at 5. "[I]n carrying
on law related occupations and professions, the lawyer almost inevitably will engage
to some extent in the practice of law, even though the activities are such that a lay-
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subject to the standards of the bar.1"6
2. Conduct of the Dual Occupation
An attorney must meet all applicable ABA rules when per-
forming a secondary occupation." ' Under the Code, an attor-
ney must avoid confusion, conflict of interest and an
appearance of impropriety in his secondary activities.' In ad-
dition, he must follow the rules pertaining to solicitation, ad-
vertising, and compensation. 10 9
3. Avoiding Confusion
Avoiding confusion among the various functions is the most
common problem an attorney must overcome. State bar as-
sociations generally require that an attorney separate the activ-
ities of his two occupations. °10 The harshest application of this
rule requires an attorney either to maintain separate offices"1
man can engage in them without being engaged in the practice of law." Id. at 3; accord
Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 103 (1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:2901. Part of the reason the attorney is considered to
inevitably be carrying on the practice of law is that an attorney has a duty to render
candid advice which includes giving advice beyond the law as to moral, economic, so-
cial and political issues where relevant to a client's situation. See CODE, supra note 16,
EC 7-8 and MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 2.1.
106. Formal Op. 328, supra note 88. For example, fees set by a lawyer operating a
mortgage brokerage or loan brokerage business from his law office must conform to
DR 2-106, supra note 87. Additionally, publicity for the second occupation and meth-
ods of seeking business must be in accord with DR 2-101, DR 2-103 and DR 2-104,
supra note 87.
107. See note 88 and accompanying text. See also Standing Comm. on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct, State Bar of Cal., Op. 69 (1982) (Attorney-Real Estate
Broker), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1604; Formal Op. 384
(1980) (Attorney-Real Estate Broker, reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL supra note 103,
at 801:1701; Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 103 (1981) (Attorney-finan-
cial consultant), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801-2901; Ethics
Comm. of the State Bar of Mont., Op. 22 (1981) (Attorney-life insurance agent), re-
printed in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:6110.
108. Formal Op. 328, supra note 88.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Mont., Op. 17 (1980), reprinted in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5403 (attorney-real estate broker) (simulta-
neous practice is allowed if the attorney completely separates the practice of law from
the other business.).
111. See Ethics Comm. of the Mo. State Bar, Informal Op. 3 (1981), reprinted in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5255 (attorney-small business consultant
with non-lawyer partner) ("[t]he lawyer may not, in any event, practice law from the
same office."); Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ill. State Bar Assoc, Op. 706 (1980), re-
printed in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:3006 (lawyer-physician) ("[a]
lawyer may also practice medicine.., if separate offices are kept and other efforts are
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or abstain from providing both legal and non-legal services to
the same client.'12 In most situations, however, an attorney is
only required to maintain a clear distinction between the two
practices, specifically by avoiding the commingling of expenses,
receipts, files, and records. 113
4. Confidentiality
When an attorney is acting in a dual capacity he must be cau-
tious of the conflicting duties of confidence and disclosure that
may be placed upon him by each of his occupations.1 The law-
yer may have a duty under the Code to preserve confidences
and secrets or information acquired in carrying on the second
occupation, even though others engaged in that occupation do
not have a similar duty.
1 5
made to isolate the two practices."); Ethics Advisory Comm. of the S.C. State Bar, Op.
10 (1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:7902 (attorney-of-
ficer, stockholder, or director of real estate purchasing and loan closing business)
("collateral business should be kept separate and apart from the practice of law.").
112. See Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich., Op.
CI-931 (1983), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:4867 ("attorney
who has an ownership interest in another business may operate the business from the
same office as his law practice provided the operation and clients remain distinct.")
(emphasis added); Legal Ethics Comm. of the Dallas Bar Assoc., Op. 11 (1981), re-
printed in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra, note 103, at 801:8404 (a lawyer who is a financial
consultant for a financial management corporation may act "as an independent con-
tractor provided no other actions are taken that might involve the performance of
legal services for financial consultation clients.").
113. See Ethics Comm. of the Mo. State Bar, Op. 22 (1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5404 (lawyer-accountant) ("[c]ommingling funds ...
would unavoidably give the appearance of impropriety."); Advisory Comm. of the
Neb. State Bar Assoc., Op. 3 (1983), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUALSUpra note 103, at
801:5504 (lawyer-psychiatrist) ("A lawyer practicing a second profession must main-
tain separate files for each practice and must maintain the confidentiality of legal files
and records."). Perhaps the most drastic definition of separateness found in Comm.
on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich., Op. CI-931 (1983), re-
printed in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:4867.
An attorney who has an ownership interest in another business may operate
the business from the same office as his law practice provided the operations
and clients remain distinct; separate entrance and reception areas are used;
common areas are not used in such a way that operations and customers of
the two practices become intermingled; and separate telephone lines are
maintained.
Id.
114. See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, State
Bar of Cal., Op. 69 (1982), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1604
(attorney-real estate broker) ("the broker's duty to disclose material information ver-
sus an attorney's obligation to preserve a client's confidences.") See also CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 6067, 6068(e), 10131-10133; CODE, supra note 16, DR 4-101.
115. See Formal Op. 328, supra note 88, at 65 (attorney-accountant); Ethics Comm.
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5. Conflict of Interest
Two aspects of conflict of interest affect attorneys acting in a
dual occupation: conflict between the interests of different cli-
ents utilizing the attorney's services, and conflict between an
attorney's non-legal interests and the interests of his client.
Although these are issues that any attorney may face, the po-
tential conflict may become amplified for an attorney who un-
dertakes a secondary occupation, due to the increased level of
personal interest and number of clients within a specific subject
area.
The attorney wants the secondary occupation to be lucrative
and successful, and, depending on the nature of the second oc-
cupation, a proprietary,116 possessory," 7 security1 8 or pecuni-
ary"19 interest adverse to a client may exist in violation of the
Code. 2 ' Therefore, an attorney is under an obligation to deter-
mine whether his self-interest will interfere with the exercise
of his professional judgment on behalf of his client. 2' An attor-
ney is not prohibited from providing legal representation to a
client who has a potentially conflicting or similar interest in
the attorney's secondary occupation. 122 However, the attorney
must fully disclose the possible effect that the similar or con-
of the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Op. 384 (1980), reprinted in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 103, at 801:1701 (attorney-real estate broker).
116. A "proprietary interest" is "[t]he interest of an owner of property together
with all rights appurtenant thereto such as the right to vote shares of stock and right
to participate in managing if the person has a proprietary interest in the shares."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (5th ed. 1979).
117. A "possessory interest" is a "[rnight to exert control over specific land to the
exclusion of others . . . though it need not be accompanied by title." Id. at 1049.
118. A "security interest" is "any interest in property acquired by contract for the
purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation indemnifying against
loss or liability." Id. at 1217.
119. A "pecuniary interest" is "[a] direct interest related to money in an action or
case as would, for example, require a judge to disqualify himself from sitting on a case
if he owned stock in a corporate party." Id. at 1018.
120. See DR 5-104(A), supra note 87; MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.8(a);
CAL. RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-101.
Because of the inherent conflicts that may arise between the interest of an
attorney in representing a client and the interest of an attorney who is acting
as the broker, it follows that this conflict of interest prohibits the attorney
from acting as attorney at the same time that he acts as a broker. Such an
arrangement would contravene DR 5-105(A) and DR 5-107(B) of the Code.
Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Association of Nassau County, Op. 3 (1984),
reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:184.
121. Colo. Bar Association Ethics Comm., Op. 57(2) (1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1901 (attorney-business transaction with client).
122. DR 5-104, supra note 87.
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flicting interests of the secondary occupation would have on the
legal representation for the client.'23
6. Limitations on Practice, Advertising, and Publicity
Traditionally a lawyer has been forbidden from publicly stat-
ing or implying that he is a specialist in any area of law. 124 The
rationale for this rule is that such a communication will be mis-
leading 25 or will constitute unfair "touting," allowing an attor-
ney to bring in engagements which he would not otherwise
attract. 26 This same principle has been applied to attorneys
acting in a dual profession. Commentators suggest that al-
lowing an attorney to state that he is engaged in a secondary
occupation may misleadingly imply that he is a specialist in the
area of law connected with that secondary occupation. 127 In re-
cent years there has been a growing acceptance of lawyer ad-
vertising 28 and a subsequent relaxation in the strict rules
barring an attorney from stating or advertising his qualifica-
tions. However, in spite of the liberalization of attorney adver-
tising rules, some jurisdictions still preclude a lawyer from
communicating any skills he may have beyond his basic legal
training.
129
Even where an attorney is allowed to advertise his training in
both of his professional capacities, there are varying levels of
123. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ill. State Bar Assoc., Op. 706 (1980), reprinted
in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:3006 (attorney-physician).
124. DR 2-105, supra note 88; CODE, supra note 16, EC 2-14 (an exception is ex-
pressly allowed if an attorney practices in the areas of Patent, Trademark and other
specialties allowed by state law). See also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 27 (1908).
125. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 7.4 comment.
126. Mintz, Accountancy and Law: Should Dual Practice be Proscribed? 53 A.B.A.
J. 225, 229 (1967).
127. Id.
128. The first major change was reflected in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977), where the Court held that "advertising by attorneys may not be subjected
to blanket suppression ... " Id. at 383.
129. See Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Mont., Op. 17 (1980), reprinted in LAW-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5403 (attorney-real estate broker) (an attorney
may not "identify himself as a lawyer in connection with any publication or printing
of the other business"); ETHICS ADVISORY COMM. OF THE S.C. STATE BAR, Op. 10
(1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra, note 103, at 801:7902 (attorney-real
estate, loan closing business) ("the lawyer must not identify himself as a lawyer in
any publication regarding the business."). Model Rule 7.4 is more stringent than the
Code; the Model Rules prohibit any type of statement to the effect that an attorney's
practice is limited or concentrated in one or more fields. See MODEL RULES supra
note 16, Rule 7.4 comment. This could have restrictive effects even in the states that
allow more liberal conduct, if adopted by those states.
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allowable conduct. Some jurisdictions allow a lawyer to iden-
tify his two professions on his letterhead, office sign or profes-
sional card. 3 ° Others may allow him to advertise his dual
status only in publications connected with his non-legal prac-
tice13" ' or in his legal advertising literature provided that the
secondary occupation requires qualifications that are related to
the practice of law.'32 Generally, even if an attorney is allowed
to list dual professional status in legal advertisements, the ad-
vertisement must be dignified and may not include an adver-
tisement of the attorney's secondary occupational services. 33
7. Solicitation
Except in limited circumstances, an attorney is barred from
accepting employment that arises from his suggestion that a
non-client needs legal services.3 The attorney is precluded
from using his secondary business to solicit clients for his law
practice, 3 and is often prohibited from accepting legal clients
where he has given unsolicited advice 136 or where the matter
originated from the attorney's secondary occupation. 13 7 If a po-
130. E.g., Advisory Comm. of the Neb. State Board, Op. 3 (1983), reprinted in LAW-
YER'S MANUAL,SUpra note 103, at 801:5504 (attorney-psychiatrist); Ethics Comm. of
the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Formal Op. 384 (1980), reprinted in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1701 (attorney-real estate broker).
131. Neb. Op. 3, supra note 130.
132. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich., Op. CI-
598 (1981), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:4816-17 (attorney-
other business).
133. See Ethics Comm of the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc., Formal Op. 384
(1980), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1701 (attorney-real es-
tate broker) (an attorney is only allowed to advertise his ability to act in both
capacities).
134. None of the enumerated exceptions includes the practice of a secondary occu-
pation. DR 2-104, supra note 87. See also CODE, supra note 16, EC 2-4; Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Ill. State Bar Assoc., Op. 745 (1982), reprinted in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 103, at 801:3009 (the dual practice of attorney-marriage counselor "is
not per se unethical, [but] the lawyer opens the door for accusations of solicitation of
legal business when the other occupation is performed from the same location and for
the benefit of the same client.").
135. Id. See also Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Assoc. of Nassau
County, Op. 3 (1984), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:184 (at-
torney-real estate broker); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1497 (1983),reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5504
(attorney-psychiatrist); New York City Ethics Comm., Op. 77 (1981), reprinted in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:6328 (attorney-computer consultant).
136. See, e.g., New York State Ethics Comm., Op. 556 (1984), reprinted in LAW-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:6110 (attorney-title insurance issuer); Informal
Op. 1497, supra note 135.
137. Formal Op. 206, supra note 104.
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tential client approaches an attorney seeking to utilize the at-
torney's services in both his legal and non-legal capacities, it is
not clear what the ABA would advise the attorney to do. The
lack of ABA guidelines in this area has prompted commenta-
tors to suggest that the attorney would be allowed to represent
the client in the dual capacity provided the attorney followed
the ABA rules regarding conflict of interest.
138
8. Compensation
Alternative fee arrangements have also been a source of con-
cern. It has been established that a contingency or percentage
fee based on settlement or success of a given transaction is al-
lowable. 139 This is important for an attorney engaging in a sec-
ondary occupation because the services performed in such an
occupation may not be conducive to an hourly fee arrangement.
In both the attorney's legal practice and secondary occupation,
fee setting is governed by a standard of reasonableness.14 ° If
the attorney does not charge an hourly rate, he may be compen-
sated as set out in a written fee arrangement.1
4'
C. The Real World: Compliance and Enforcement
Although the aforementioned constraints may appear rigid,
their proscriptive value should be examined in light of the reg-
ulatory procedure embraced by the ABA. "The regulation of
the legal profession is primarily under the control of state
138. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Todd v. City of Visalia, 254 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 62 Cal. Rptr. 485, 482
(1967) ("An attorney has a right to contract for compensation for his services, and it
was not improper for him to secure a contingent provision based upon success."); Bril-
lhart v. Hudson, 455 P.2d 878, 881, 169 Colo. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (although the court
held that a contingent fee resulting in recovery of $7,500 for a $50,000 sale of a pool
hall was unreasonable, it also said that it is permissible for an attorney to contract for
a reasonable contingency fee, with the court reserving the right to subject the amount
to the test of quantum meruit).
140. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Mont., Op. 22 (1981), reprinted in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5404; DR 2-106, supra note 87 (an attorney
should rigorously adhere to the code in setting fees).
141. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, State Bar of
Cal., Op. 69 (1982), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:1604 (an
attorney-real estate broker "may be compensated as set out in a written fee agree-
ment either by sharing in the real estate broker's commission upon the transaction's
completion or at the attorney's usual hourly rate if the transaction is not consum-
mated"). Cf. Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Mont., Op. 22 (1981), reprinted in LAW-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 103, at 801:5404 (an attorney-life insurance agent "may be




supreme courts. In all but a few states, however, supreme
court control... means little more than rulemaking and an in-
volvement in disciplinary review. ' 142 The primary responsibil-
ity for enforcement of rules and "discipline lies with state or
local bar organizations.' 1 43 With few exceptions, these organi-
zations "maintain no significant self-initiating investigative"
procedures.'4 4 Instead they merely investigate third party com-
plaints received from clients and other attorneys. 4 ' "The fact
that individual clients are the primary source of complaints
tends... to limit the range of lawyer misconduct that [is] re-
ported.' 46 "Few clients complain about solicitation and virtu-
ally none [complain] about misconduct" which benefits the
client.
147
Since state bar organizations are primarily dependent on cli-
ent complaints, many of the bars' disciplinary rules become
mere ethical guidelines that an attorney may or may not choose
to follow. The result is that within the sphere of legal services
there often is no real limitation on what the practitioner should
or should not undertake. The scope of an attorney's practice is
thus primarily left to the individual attorney and to those who
become his clients.148 The ABA is hopeful that the attorney
will understand that the rules are for the protection of cli-
ents,149 and that attorneys will want to uphold the respectabil-
ity and integrity of the profession. 5 °
To summarize, a lawyer acting in a dual capacity or secon-
dary occupation must be attuned to which of his functions re-
late to legal counseling and which do not. If secondary
functions are related, as agent and manager services are, 5' the
142. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 86, at 921 (federal courts and agencies sepa-
rately regulate attorneys who practice before them).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 922.
145. Id.
146. Client complaints "tend to deal with contractual disputes concerning the qual-
ity of legal services rendered or an attorney's failure to meet his client's. expectations
as to cost or promptness of service." Id. at 923.
147. Id. at 949.
148. Mintz, supra note 126, at 228.
149. The fact that ABA-accredited law schools are now required to offer courses on
professional responsibility and that many states require bar applicants to pass the Na-
tional Professional Responsibility Exam, shows the attempt by the ABA and state bar
associations to instill ethical values in attorneys. See, e.g., MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION INFORMATION BOOKLET ii (1986).
150. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 86, at 921.
151. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
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Code requires that the attorney follow ethical rules pertaining
to avoidance of confusion, confidentiality, conflict of interest,
limitation of practice, solicitation, and compensation.
IV
The Non-ABA Rules Governing the Secondary
Occupation
The activities of attorneys acting in their agent or manager
capacity are also governed by a number of rules which emanate
from outside the legal profession. States, legislatures, guilds
and unions place additional constraints on personal representa-
tives. In an attempt to protect artists and facilitate business re-
lationships within the entertainment industry, these entities
have promulgated regulations that govern an attorney in his
secondary occupation of talent agent or manager.
Determining which rules will govern an attorney's secondary
occupation depends upon whether the attorney is performing
the functions of a personal manager 15 2 or a talent agent 153 and
whether the attorney is practicing law in New York, California,
or another state.' As discussed previously, the functions of
each personal representative overlap; this has created confu-
sion and competition within the entertainment industry and
has sparked debate as to what constitutes the best procedure
for regulating personal representatives.5 5 This confusion is ex-
emplified by the fact that the California legislature has repeat-
edly amended its statute regulating artists' managers since it
first "recognized the difference between artists' managers and
ordinary employment agencies" in 1943.156 California is still
152. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
154. The entertainment business is concentrated in limited geographic areas - pri-
marily New York and California. Each of these states regulates talent agents and
personal managers differently. See infra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Hearings, supra note 28.
156. More specifically, in 1943 the California legislature enacted statutes to regu-
late artists managers within the regulatory scheme applicable to employment agen-
cies in order to bring them under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. Act
approved May 2, 1943, ch 329, 1943 Cal. Stat. 1326. In 1959, the Artists Managers Act
was added to the Labor Code and separated from employment agency legislation.
Artists' Managers Act ch. 888, 1959 Cal. Stat. 2920. In 1967, the Labor Code sections
regulating employment agencies were repealed and jurisdiction shifted to the Bureau
of Employment Agencies, Act approved Aug. 28, 1967, ch. 1505, §§ 2, 3, 13, 14, 1967 Cal.
Stat. 3571, 3572. In 1975, the Whetmore Musician's Booking Agency Act was enacted.
Whetmore Musician's Booking Agency Act, ch. 1236, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3138. In 1978, the
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grappling with its regulatory scheme - it created the Califor-
nia Entertainment Commission in 1982 to study the entertain-
ment industry and propose new legislation.
157
In addition to state laws, entertainment guilds and unions
control the conduct of personal representatives. Such regula-
tions and restrictions regarding exact contract provisions and
fees reach further than state laws and are thought to be more
stringent than the state originated restrictions. 58
Many practitioners in the entertainment industry are una-
ware that their status as an attorney does not immunize their
practice as a talent agent or personal manager from these other
regulations.159 An attorney who, in addition to legal advice,
provides talent agent or personal manager services needs to
know of, understand, and meet the requirements placed on him
by the applicable state and entertainment unions.
A. Rules Governing Business Conduct
1. State Law in New York and California
In California and New York, talent agents are regulated by
Whetmore Act was repealed and the Artist Managers Act became the Talent Agency
Act which clarified that talent agents were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Com-
missioner and not the Business and Professions Code or the Bureau of Employment
Agencies. Talent Agency Act, ch. 1382, § 6, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4576. In 1982, the legisla-
ture added a temporary exception providing that the procuring of record contracts
was not of itself subject to regulation. Act approved Aug. 31, 1982, ch. 682, § 1, 1982
Cal. Stat 2814, 2815. In 1984, A.B. 3753 extended the 1982 provision for an additional
year pending a report by the Entertainment Commission regarding a model bill. Act
effective July 17, 1984, ch. 553, § 7, 1984 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 413, 414 (Deering). For
a more in-depth history of the Artists Managers Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.1-.47
(West 1971 and Supp. 1986), from inception through 1978, see Note, supra note 28, at
357-61; Johnson & Lang, supra note 42. For a discussion of the Act since 1978 see
Brindze, California Assembly Bill 997: The Personal Managers Relief Act, in 1983 EN-
TERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 247.
157. Brindze, supra note 156, at 250. The Entertainment Commission's mandate
states:
The Commission shall study the laws and practices of this state, the state of
New York, and other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to
the licensing of agents and representation of artists in the entertainment in-
dustry in general, and in the recording industry in particular, so to enable the
Commission to recommend to the legislature a model bill regarding this
licensing.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1702 (West Supp. 1983) (CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1701-04 (West Supp.
1986), establishing the entertainment commission, was repealed by its own terms on
January 1, 1986).
158. See infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 28, at 222; Panel Discussion, supra note 57
(Donald Engel, Lionel Sobel, and Penny Semple Von Bozzay).
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statute. 6 ' Although no specific statutory legislation exists with
respect to personal managers, they are in large measure regu-
lated by virtue of the definition of talent agent or theatrical
agent.'61 The personal manager is generally prohibited from
seeking employment for the artist, while the talent agent is re-
quired to seek employment and is permitted to advise, counsel
and direct the artist in the development of the artist's career.16
2
The extent of regulation in New York and California differ in
important respects and merit further examination.
(a) California
Under California's Talent Agency Act, 63 a talent agent is re-
quired to obtain an employment agency license which gives the
agent the right to procure employment for the entertainer.
6 4
The talent agent must put up a bond, 65 present references, 66
establish an office approved by the commissioner, 67 submit a
fee schedule, 68 submit all form contracts with artists to the La-
bor Commissioner for approval, 169 permit the artist to termi-
160. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-.47 (West 1971 and Supp. 1986); N.Y. ARTS & CULT.
AFF. LAW §§ 37.01-.05 (McKinney 1983).
161. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text (personal managers); supra
notes 43-52 and accompanying text (talent agents).
162. Thaler & Joseph, supra note 31, at 2.
163. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-.47 (West 1971 and Supp. 1986) (law regulating
talent agents). For the definition of talent agency as defined by section 1700.4, see
supra text accompanying note 44. Section 1700.5 sets forth the necessity of attaining a
license: "No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency
without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner.. .. " Id. Sec-
tions 1700-.4 set forth the scope and definitions, sections 1700.6-.22 discuss licensing
provisions), and sections 1700.23-.46 contain operation and management provisions.
164. Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 45.
165. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.15 (West Supp. 1986).
166. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.6, 1700.9 (West Supp. 1986).
167. Id.
168. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.24 (West Supp. 1986).
169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West Supp. 1986). The exact provisions required in
such contracts are:
(a) term of employment;
(b) compensation to the artists' manager not to exceed rate.., set.., forth
in schedule of fees filed with the Labor Commissioner ... ;
(c) The artists' manager has a duty to advise, counsel or direct the artist in
the ... development of his professional career;
(d) reasonable efforts to procure employment in the field artists' manager is
representing the artist;
(e) termination of contract if failure to obtain employment for any time in
excess of four months, provided that artist was ready, willing, able and avail-
able to accept employment;
(f) all cases of controversy between artists' manager and an artist arising
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nate the agent's contract if engagements are not forthcoming
within a 120 day period,' 7' and agree to submit all disputes to
the Labor Commissioner. 17 ' Any employment contract pro-
cured in violation of the Act could be vitiated and any individ-
ual negotiating such a contract could be subject to possible
repayment of any commissions received from the artist.
72
Over the years, there has been confusion as to whether per-
sonal representatives other than talent agents are subject to the
Talent Agency Act.7 3 The definition of "talent agent" embod-
ied in the Act includes anyone who engages in the occupation of
"procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure em-
ployment or engagements for an artist or artists. Talent agents
may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of
their professional careers."' 74 As a result of this broad defini-
tion, personal managers claimed that the Act was too harsh in
that it precluded them from procuring engagements,'75 unless
they held an employment agency license.
In 1982, new legislation amended the Talent Agency Act.
7 6
under the Labor Code ... relating to the terms of the contract shall be re-
ferred [1] to the Labor Commissioner.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 12001 (1970) (LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, art. VI, General
Rules and Regulations for Artists' Managers).
170. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West Supp. 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 12001
(1970).
171. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West Supp. 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 12001
(1970).
172. Thaler, supra note 31, at 9. See also Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App.
2d 347, 351, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1967); Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 398.
173. Since a voluminous amount of material has been written on the scope of the
Talent Agent Act and its regulatory scheme, this note will briefly address the matter
in the context of the attorney-agent and attorney-manager.
174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1986).
175. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
176. The 1982 legislation performs six principal functions:
(1) It removes entirely the activities of promising to procure, offering to pro-
cure, and procuring a recording contract from the list of activities that define
a talent agency.
(2) It clarifies that a person acting in conjunction with a talent agent and
working at the talent agent's request in procuring or attempting to procure
employment does not, by so working with a talent agent, become a talent
agent.
(3) It places a one-year statute of limitations on violations of the applicable
provisions of the Labor Code.
(4) It removes all criminal penalties for violation of these provisions.
(5) It sets up the California Entertainment Commission to study and propose
new legislation.
(6) It self-destructs on January 1, 1985.
Brindze, supra note 156, at 250.
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A new exemption was added which stated that "the activities of
procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording contracts
for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or cor-
poration to regulation and licensing under this chapter." '177
Thus, the amendment provided personal managers and attor-
neys an opportunity to procure recording contracts without sat-
isfying the rigid employment agency licensing requirements
under the Act. The main benefit of the exemption was that it
recognized that recording contracts are usually negotiated by
personal managers and attorneys, rather than talent agents.
178
It also allowed unlicensed personal representatives to negotiate
contracts if working with, and at the request of, a licensed and
franchised talent agent.
179
Enforcement power and jurisdiction of the Talent Agency
Act lie with the California Labor Commission.' Thus, if a dis-
pute or controversy arises between artists and individuals who
perform the services of a talent agent, the California Labor
Commission has original jurisdiction over the action.' 8 ' The
Labor Commission has the authority to establish the liability of
the parties involved,182 void any contracts between the parties,
stop payment of any further compensation, and use discretion
to determine whether the artist should receive restitution of all
monies paid to the personal representative or whether the unli-
censed talent agent is entitled to keep his or her compensation
on the basis of quantum meruit. 8 3 After the Labor Commis-
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1983) (repealed 1986) (emphasis added).
See also supra note 158.
178. Brindze, supra note 156, at 251.
179. It shall not be unlawful for a person or corporation who is not licensed
under this chapter to act in conjunction with and at the request of a duly
licensed and franchised talent agency in the negotiations of an employment
contract.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West. Supp. 1983) (repealed 1986). See also, Brindze, supra
note 156, at 252.
180. Note, supra note 32, at 846-57 for an in-depth examination of how the Labor
Commissioner regulates talent agent disputes.
181. Under § 1700.45, the parties can substitute a provision providing for decision
by arbitration in lieu of initial determination by the Labor Commission. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1700.45 (West Supp. 1986). See Singer, Regulation of Talent Agents: The Rich-
ard Pryor Determination, 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HAND-
BOOK 255.
182. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 358, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 371
(1967). (The court reaffirmed that the Labor Commissioner's office is the exclusive
forum in which a dispute could be initiated when a violation of the Artists' Managers
Act is at issue.)
183. See Singer, supra note 181, at 258.
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sion resolves the controversy between the artist and talent
agent, a party has the right to appeal to the superior court,
where the matter will be heard in a trial de novo. 84
Commentators have observed that the Talent Agency Act
has no substantive impact, and that the only time the statute is
effective is when an agent wants to sue for a fee, 185 or a client
wants to void a contract with a personal manager. 186 The Labor
Commission relies on complaints from performers, unions, tal-
ent agents and attorneys as to unauthorized procurement activ-
ity. 87 Once the complaint is received, the Labor Commission is
required to investigate the matter. If it finds that an individual
is acting as an unlicensed talent agent, it is required to enforce
the Talent Agency Act by filing a criminal complaint with the
District Attorney's Office. 88 In the absence of a complaint, the
Labor Commission rarely initiates overt action to enforce the
Act's provisions."9 The Labor Commission has admitted that it
184. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West Supp. 1986).
185. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Donald Engel).
186. E.g., Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350-51; 62 Cal. Rptr.
364, 366-67 (1967). (The Jefferson Airplane brought suit against their personal man-
ager, Katz, to rescind the contract between them on the grounds that Katz had vio-
lated the Talent Agency Act.)
187. In general it is thought that California's licensing of occupations is inconsis-
tent and haphazard. Cathcart & Graff, Occupational Licensing: Factoring It Out, 9
PAC. L.J. 147, 148 (1978).
188. Hearings, supra note 28, at 192-93 ([A violation of § 1700 is a misdemeanor]
generally... we try to get them to get a license.").
189. Halloran, supra note 76, at 127 ("The California Labor Commissioner main-
tains that lawyer-agents should be licensed, but so far the Commissioner has not
taken any overt action in this regard."); Hearings, supra note 28, at 222. Although the
Labor Commission maintains that attorneys must be licensed as talent agents, confu-
sion runs rampant among individuals in the field, including legislators and attorneys.
During the 1975 Hearings before the Industrial Relations Committee, there was some
debate on whether attorneys were meant to be covered by the Act. Senator
Whetmore stated that it was not his intent in drafting the bill for the Musicians Book-
ing Agent Act to bring lawyers or certified public accountants in, merely because they
were drafting contracts for a musician. Hearings, supra note 28, at 20. Mr. Davis,
President of Conference of Personal Managers, West, did not feel that attorneys were
subject, because the state bar was too strong, and that it was unnecessary to duplicate
regulation regarding the fiduciary responsibility for an attorney. Hearings, supra
note 28, at 43. Senator Presley seemed to feel that if an attorney was in the business
of talent agency then the attorney should be licensed. Hearings, supra note 28, at 44.
Mr. Loromer, attorney with Loeb & Loeb, stated that "lawyers would not be covered
because they have a license which at the present time and historically has covered this
kind of an area, but the unlicensed people, the public relations consultants and the
personal managers, obviously are the persons they intend to cover." Hearings, supra
note 28, at 121. It is unclear as to whether this confusion exists because the Labor
Commission has been passive in the action taken, or because of the lack of express
intent in the legislation. Regardless, since the Labor Commission has been delegated
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has no specific legislative authority over the amount of commis-
sions paid between managers and artists, and that its sole sub-
stantive policing power involves examining submitted contracts
to insure that the terms are not unjust or oppressive.19 °
In conclusion, it is likely that California attorneys will be
subject to the licensing requirements of the Talent Agency Act
if they perform procurement services for an artist.191 Under
the most recent legislation, an attorney is only exempt from
licensing if he procures or negotiates recording contracts as op-
posed to procuring appearance or performance agreements. 92
An attorney may also be exempt if he is working closely with a
licensed talent agent.193 Aside from activities falling within
this narrow exception, an attorney acting in violation of the
Act's provisions could be subject to the penalties of restitution
and loss of commissions.
(b) New York
Under New York's Theatrical Employment Agencies Law, 94
the definition of theatrical employment agency appears to be
substantially similar to the definition of "talent agent" under
the authority to regulate the Talent Agency Act, and since the Labor Commission
feels that attorneys are subject to licensing under the Act, attorneys probably are
subject to penalties for violating the provisions of the Act.
190. Hearings, supra note 28, at 197.
191. See supra note 189.
192. Supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
193. Supra note 179 and accompanying text.
194. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 37.01, 37.03, 37.05 (McKinney 1983) (New
York law regarding "theatrical employment agencies"). Prior to 1983, the law affect-
ing theatrical employment agents was set forth in the New York General Business
Law. The transfer of location was not accompanied by any substantive; changes in the
law. The creation of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law as a separate set of laws was
done for policy reasons. The declaration of policy by the legislature states:
It is hereby found that many of our citizens lack the opportunity to view,
enjoy or participate in... the performing and fine arts generally. It is hereby
further found that, with increasing leisure time, the practice and enjoyment
of the arts are of increasing importance and that the general welfare of the
people of the state will be promoted by giving further recognition to the arts
as a vital aspect of our culture and heritage and as a valued means of ex-
panding the scope of our educational programs .... [I]t is further declared
that all activities undertaken by the state in carrying out this policy shall be
directed toward encouraging and assisting rather than in any ways limiting
the freedom of artistic expression that is essential for the well-being of the
arts.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW preface (McKinney 1983).
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California law.195 There is, however, one important distinction
between the New York and California laws. Unlike the Cali-
fornia definition of "talent agent" embodied in the Talent
Agency Act, the New York law states that a "'[t]heatrical em-
ployment agency'... does not include the business of managing
such entertainments, exhibitions, or performances, or the art-
ists or attractions constituting the same, where such business
only incidentally involves the seeking of employment there-
for.'1 96 Thus, when a contract is either signed in New York or
deemed performed in New York, a personal manager need not
be licensed as a theatrical employment agent as long as the act
of seeking employment is "only incidental" to the performance
of his other managerial duties.
97
New York cases have not definitively interpreted the mean-
ing of "incidental," but have focused on the issue of whether
the personal manager is personally obligated to manage or pro-
cure employment pursuant to the terms of the contract be-
tween himself and the artist. 9 ' The regulation and
determination of whether a personal manager's procurement
violates the incidental exception is initially decided by the
courts. If the court finds that the personal manager's conduct
is outside the incidental exemption, the case is remanded to the
New York License Commission, the equivalent of the Califor-
nia Labor Commission. 99 The effectiveness of New York's reg-
ulation is difficult to assess as the licensing regulation appears
195. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West Supp. 1986); see supra text accompanying
note 44.
196. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 37.01 (McKinney 1983) (emphasis added).
197. E.g., Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680, 680, 395 N.Y.S. 2d 611, 611
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (a booking agent who secures lectures and engagements for a
client who is a motion picture and theatrical personality must secure an employment
agency license unless the agent is in the business of managing such clientele and the
seeking of employment is only incidentally involved). See also Reed, supra note 37, at
86.
198. See, e.g., Pawlauski v. Woodruff, 122 Misc. 695, 695-96, 203 N.Y.S. 819, 820 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 212 App. Div. 871, 208 N.Y.S. 912 (1925) (contract engaging plain-
tiff as an exclusive manager, but providing that the plaintiff is to secure engagements
for defendant constituted a contract for management and only incidentally for seek-
ing employment); Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680, 680, 395 N.Y.S. 2d
611, 611 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (the requirement of an employment agency license ap-
plies to a booking agent who secures lectures and engagements for a client who is a
motion picture and theatrical personality unless the agent is in the business of manag-
ing such a clientele and the seeking of employment is only incidentally involved) (em-
phasis added).
199. Hearings, supra note 28, at 217.
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to be only rarely enforced.0 °
An attorney acting as an agent or a personal manager who
procures employment for his clients probably would fall within
the "incidental" exemption specified in the New York statute.
Consequently, an attorney practicing in New York would most
likely not be required to obtain a theatrical employment agency
license. However, an attorney practicing in both New York and
California would be well-advised to acquire a license under Cal-
ifornia law, unless he is involved solely in the procurement of
recording contracts.20 '
2. Guild and Union Regulation
The entertainment trade union or guild is a second type of
regulatory body which imposes standards and rules on the at-
torney-agent and attorney-manager. Trade unions regulate
working conditions and professional relationships in the en-
tertainment industry by controlling the activities of their mem-
bers and those who enter into employment or service
agreements with their members.20 2 The three unions in the en-
tertainment industry which affect attorney-agents are the
Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the American Federation of Musi-
cians (AFM), and the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists (AFTRA).20 3 These unions have authority over
actors, vocalists, and musicians, who together comprise the
overwhelming majority of artists serviced by personal
representatives.20 4
The representative relationship that the guilds primarily reg-
ulate is that between the artist and the talent agent.2 5 Each
union franchises the talent agencies.20 6 Without a franchise
agreement from a particular union, a talent agency is precluded
from procuring employment for any members of that union.20 7
200. Id. at 216.
201. Thaler & Joseph, supra note 31, at 11-13.




206. Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 45.
207. A union artist who violates a union by-law by using a non-franchised talent
agent can be subject to fine, suspension or expulsion from the union. This can have a
serious effect on the artist because employers in a collective bargaining agreement
with the union are precluded from hiring non-union members. See Johnson & Lang,
supra note 42, at 412; Note, supra note 28, at 364-65.
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Once the talent agency has acquired a franchise agreement, 20 8 it
is subject to the duties and obligations set out in the agree-
ment.2"9 Franchisees must not engage in any business conduct
other than advising, counseling, and procuring employment for
artists.21 ° Generally, the business conduct proscribed involves
situations in which an agent could also be a potential employer
of an artist.2 1
Although union regulation is primarily intended to affect tal-
ent agents, it may also affect other personal representatives.
Business managers and attorneys may be subject to union regu-
lations if they act as agents.212 Regardless of whether one is an
attorney, personal manager or business manager, if he solicits
business for an artist, the unions would seek to regulate the
activity.2 13
B. Regulation of Fee Practices
Personal representatives in the entertainment industry usu-
ally receive payment in the form of commissions.2 14 Personal
managers generally charge between ten and twenty-five per-
cent 215 of the artist's gross receipts in addition to reimburse-
ment for travel and other special expenses. 6 The amount that
personal managers may receive in commissions is not directly
208. An agent must make an application to the national office. Once the applicant
shows proof of a talent agency or employment agency license, a franchise will be
granted. No fees or bonds are required and the agent will not be limited as to the area
in which he may operate. Hearings, supra note 28, at 92.
209. Franchise agreements set out duties and obligations primarily to control com-
pensation. Id. at 4. Also, they determine the duration of the agreement and preclude
the agency from certain other activities. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying
text. The contract must state the maximum duration of the agreement as set forth by
the guidelines of the specific union. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 416-18; see
also Note, supra note 32, at 842-45 (detailed discussion of union regulating mecha-
nisms and provisions). The contract must also include a termination clause which
provides that if a client does not work a certain amount in a set period of time, ranging
from one to five years, he may terminate the contract. See, e.g., AFM by-laws, art.
XXIII § 11, at 133 (rev. ed. 1981); SAG Agency Relations, amended Rule 16(g), § XVI-
13, at 28; see generally Hearings, supra note 28, at 4-5; Note, supra note 33, at 843-44.
210. Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 417.
211. Hearings, supra note 28, at 19.
212. Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 413 n.195.
213. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Donald Tayer, Attorney at Law, San
Francisco).
214. A "commission" is a fixed percentage, set by contract, of an artist's earnings.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (5th ed. 1979).
215. Questions and Answers, supra note 27, at 47.
216. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 86. Under an alternative
method of compensation, a manager "receive[s] payments on a net receipts computa-
ENTERTAINMENT ATTORNEYS
regulated by any law or union regulation. Business managers
usually charge between two to six percent of the gross receipts
handled. Sometimes a business manager may charge a flat
monthly or annual fee instead.
Although trade practices generally dictate fee ceilings, fees
charged by talent agents are unique in that union regulations,
and not trade practices, govern the maximum amount receiva-
ble. However, New York talent agents are subject to a statu-
tory fee ceiling.217 By contrast, California law sets no
maximum on fees an agent may charge, but the Labor Commis-
sion has the authority to review contracts of licensed talent
agents in order to ascertain whether fees are oppressive or un-
just.218 Agents' fees vary, depending mainly on the clientele of
the agency: a literary agent's commission is usually ten per-
cent, a talent agency may charge from ten to twenty percent,
and an amateur play-licensing agent, twenty percent.219 Where
the agent assembles a package deal, for example in the film in-
dustry, by representing the author of a book as well as the pro-
ducer, director and screenwriter, and is involved in the creation
of an artistic work, his total commission could be much
higher.2 °
Fee ceilings for talent agents in the movie and recording in-
dustries are imposed by the various entertainment unions.22'
Generally, an agent can charge up to ten percent for general
services rendered and up to twenty percent for a single night
engagement. 222 The unions proscribe double commissions, by
decreeing that the maximum commission allowed is the total
amount payable collectively to any and all persons functioning
as a talent agent.223 While the unions recognize that an artist
may have other advisors who are entitled to compensation, the
tion rather than gross receipts. Such arrangements will often be at a higher percent-
age rate while sometimes resulting in a lesser cash expense to the artist." Id.
217. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 185 (McKinney 1968).
218. Hearings, supra note 28, at 197 ("Anything over 25 percent will hold that it is
probably oppressive and unjust.").
219. 3 A. LINDEY, supra note 49, at 1738.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., AFTRA REGULATIONS GOVERNING AGENTS, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-
22. See also Gardner & Gelfond, Talent Agencies, in THE MUSICIANS MANUAL: A
PRACTICAL CAREER GUIDE 97, 98 (M. Halloran ed. 1979); Hearings, supra note 28, at
127.
222. Hearings, supra note 28, at 127.
223. Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 414.
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guilds only regulate those procuring employment.224 Even if
the agent does not actually solicit a particular engagement,
where the agent had obtained the exclusive right of represent-
ing the artist he will usually be entitled to the commission.225
Attorneys' fees in the entertainment industry vary. There
are essentially six methods of payment: (1) hourly rate bill-
ing;226 (2) monthly or annual retainers;227 (3) flat fees for spe-
cific services rendered;22 (4) a percentage basis of the artist's
contract;229 (5) a percentage (usually five percent) of the artist's
income;230 and (6) where the lawyer and client enter a partner-
ship, a percentage of all monies arising from the partnership.
231
Additional fees may be charged for extraordinary expenses
such as travel and litigation.
232
It must be noted that use of the "percentage of total income"
or "partnership" fee arrangement may place the attorney in vi-
olation of the Code provision which proscribes the charging of
exorbitant fees.233 The courts have the power to examine any
contractual fee arrangement to check for fairness in light of the
services rendered.
234
In California, if an attorney enters into a business transaction
with a client, a presumption of undue influence arises.235 If the
fee arrangement is disputed, the attorney has the burden of
showing that the transaction was fair, that the terms were in
writing, that the amount was reasonable, and that the client
entered into the arrangement freely after consultation with in-
dependent counsel.23 6
224. Hearings, supra note 28, at 127.
225. See S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 86; Hearings, supra note
28, at 71.
226. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 79. See also Panel Discussion,
supra note 57 (Donald Engel).
227. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 86.
228. Halloran, supra note 76, at 129.
229. Id.
230. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Donald Engel).
231. Id.
232. Johnson, supra note 21, at 81. See also Halloran, supra note 76, at 129.
233. DR 2-106(A), supra note 87. See also Note, supra note 74, at 822.
234. See Fein v. Schwartz, 404 S.W.2d 210, 223 (Mo. 1966) ("[In light of] the nature
and scope of the negotiations reflected by the record in this case.. .we find that the
contract was fair when entered into,.. and that the services rendered were reasonably
worth the contingent fee agreed upon.").
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2235 (West 1985). See also 7 CAL JUR, Attorneys at Law
§§ 202-06 (3d ed. 1973).
236. Fein v. Schwartz, 404 S.W.2d 210, 223 (Mo. 1966) (an attorney has the burden
of proof in enforcing a contract for compensation between himself and his client).
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Conflict of interest problems can also arise when attorneys
and clients enter partnership arrangements. These problems
come 'about because the attorney is no longer neutral and may
neglect to police his client's interests.237
It should be apparent that if an artist hires several personal
representatives and consequently pays forty-five to fifty-five
percent of his earnings to them, the artist will be tempted to
eliminate one or more representatives and thereby decrease
the commissions and fees he must pay. The astute artist who
recognizes that an attorney is subject to standards of reasona-
bleness with respect to fee setting might engage an attorney to
perform services which otherwise would be provided by other
personal representatives.2 3 Although the attorney may believe
that he is entitled to additional fees for performing multiple
services, the ABA's failure to recognize the attorney's dual
roles suggests that all fees for services, whether legal or non-
legal, will be subject to the ABA standards of reasonableness. 239
3. Summary of Issues Facing Attorney-Agents and
Attorney-Managers
The constraints imposed by the Code of Professional Con-
duct, state statutes, and guild and union regulations create nu-
merous issues which the attorney-agent/attorney-manager
must resolve in pursuing his dual occupations. First, the attor-
ney must decide whether he will procure engagements for his
artist clients. If he decides that he will be performing such
services, he must apply for and receive a talent agency li-
cense.240 He can not receive double commissions for the multi-
ple services rendered, and possibly will not even earn
commissions equivalent to those of a non-attorney representa-
tive performing the same services.241 If his clients are union
members, he must obtain a union franchise2 42 and keep legal
237. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Donald Engel).
238. HALLORAN, supra note 76, at 129.
239. For example, in the sports industry, athletic agents usually take up to ten
percent of the contract as their fee, but Leigh Steinberg, attorney-athletic agent, lim-
its his fee to four to five percent. Carroll, Agent to the Stars of Field and Tube, S.F.
Chron., January 9, 1985, at 22, col. 2.
240. Regarding California licensing requirements, see supra notes 163-64 and ac-
companying text. Regarding New York licensing requirements, supra notes 194-201
and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Informal Op. 1497, supra note 103. See also Johnson, supra note 21, at
78.
242. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
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and non-legal practices and records separate.243 He must not
initiate client contact amounting to solicitation. When clients
seek his services, he must ascertain whether they are asking for
legal or agent-manager services, and must consider whether his
personal interests or those of other clients might interfere with
his ability to render candid, loyal advice.244 Finally, once an at-
torney establishes his dual practice, he must be aware of the
continuing potential for conflicts of interest.
It is this latter consideration and the possibility that the at-
torney may breach his fiduciary duty that has attracted severe
criticism of the dual occupations of the attorney-agent/attor-
ney-manager.245 At least one commentator believes that an at-
torney who takes on a dual role may be accepting employment
for services that are beyond his capabilities.246 Yet, this criti-
cism of the attorney-agent/attorney-manager crossover is theo-
retically unfounded because the attorney is held to a higher
fiduciary standard than that applicable to personal managers or
talent agents.247 Thus, an artist who chooses an attorney as his
personal manager may have better insurance against the "nu-
merous wolves" in the entertainment industry.248 Further-
more, an attorney, unlike a talent agent or personal manager, is
under a duty to keep communications confidential 249 and is re-
quired to recommend independent counsel if a potential con-
250flict arises.
Although the criticism of the dual occupation generally ap-
pears unfounded, there may be instances in which the critics'
243. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
245. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 78.
Recently, the Conference of Personal Managers East undertook a campaign
against attorneys and accountants who are invading the ranks of [personal]
managers. One member of the committee reviewing such complaints con-
tends that artists are entitled to full-time managers, that the attorney ac-
countant has a built in conflict of interest, and that managers, faced with
growing competition, must "do something to protect themselves." Id.
246. Panel Discussion, supra note 57 (Donald Engel and Lionel Sobel).
247. "As our institutions [such as the entertainment industry] have become larger
and more complex, so have the subtleties of conflicts of interest, the 'temptation to
evade responsibilities, and the difficulties of perceiving clear answers in specific situa-
tions." Sommer, Found: Fiduciary Duties - The Search for Content, 9 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 525 (1977-1978). See generally Jossen, supra note 4.
248. Johnson, supra note 21, at 81.
249. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.6; CODE, supra note 16, Canon 4; Hal-
loran, supra note 76, at 130.
250. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rules 1.7-.9; CODE, supra note 16, DR 5-101; S.
SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 92.
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fears are valid. To the extent attorney discipline is based on
client complaints-which rarely occur 51 -attorneys may be al-
lowed to breach the fiduciary duty owed to artist-clients with-
out being penalized. Thus, some regulatory change in this area
may be warranted.
V
Avoiding and Alleviating the Dual Occupation
Hazards
There are numerous difficulties facing an attorney with a
secondary occupation as a personal manager, talent agent, or
entertainment entrepreneur. It is evident that an attorney's al-
lowable conduct is narrowly defined primarily due to the con-
flict between the high fiduciary standards required by the ABA
and the general standards of conduct prevalent in the en-
tertainment industry. In many instances a talent agent or per-
sonal manager may conduct his business using practices that
would place an attorney in violation of both his fiduciary duty
and specific rules under the Code.252
The client-protecting intentions of the ABA regulations have
interfered with the ability of attorneys to practice secondary
occupations. For attorneys to function effectively in the en-
tertainment industry, changes are needed in order to better
balance the interests of attorneys and clients. This note pro-
poses three areas of possible change: the attorney's methods of
practice; the state and union methods of regulation of attorney-
agents and attorney-managers; and the ABA's regulation of at-
torneys conducting a secondary occupation.
A. The Attorney's Methods of Practice
If no changes are forthcoming in the regulation of attorneys
in secondary occupations, several courses of action are available
to entertainment attorneys to minimize the legal and ethical
hazards of acting in various capacities.
1. Never exceed the role as legal counsel for an artist.
Pursuing this course of action requires the attorney to avoid
251. For a thorough discussion of the California State Bar Association discipline
mechanism, see Kang & Finefrock, The Brotherhood: Justice For Lawyers, S.F. Exam-
iner, March 25, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
252. See Jossen, supra note 4, at 117-19.
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the following practices: (1) entering into the personal manage-
ment of an artist; (2) soliciting employment; and (3) acquiring a
monetary interest in any financial venture that could under-
mine the attorney's role as neutral legal advisor. These limita-
tions on attorney behavior will ensure that the client receives
adequate and objective representation, and provide the attor-
ney with an adequate opportunity to oversee the other personal
representatives, stay current in his field and protect his client's
interests. There are, of course, difficulties inherent in this
course of action. Drawing the line between legal representation
and client counseling in other non-legal matters is often diffi-
cult.253 Also, an attorney may have to sacrifice the increased
economic gains he could acquire by performing multiple repre-
sentative functions.
254
2. Take on only one role for each artist, and keep the
artist informed as to which "hat" is being worn.
Even if an attorney acts as a talent agent or personal man-
ager for his clients, he can avoid possible conflicts of interest
and accusations of solicitation or improper appearance by
clearly separating the functions he performs for the artist.
Under this course of action, an attorney can conduct his prac-
tice of law and his secondary occupation at the same time by
following the rules and regulations pertinent to each profes-
sion. However, even if the attorney never operates as legal ad-
visor for a client, the Code states that the attorney should avoid
solicitation of business25 5 and charge only reasonable fees.
256
Furthermore, the attorney must be careful to recommend in-
dependent counsel should the client need legal assistance.
3. Be cautious, be wary, and follow the rules.
An attorney who wants to perform multiple functions for an
artist, and believes that the ABA's lack of self-initiated investi-
gation will render his practice immune from close supervi-
257sion, will probably act as he wishes. However, the prudent
253. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (attorneys limited to charging
reasonable fees); supra notes 214-39 and accompanying text (standard fees for the
different personal representative functions).
255. See supra note 135; DR 2-103, supra note 87.
256. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
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attorney who wishes to protect his own interest should be li-
censed as a talent agent, especially in California. If he plans to
procure engagements for an artist, he should be franchised by
the applicable unions.258 Above all, the attorney should keep
his clients happy and satisfied since bar and state agency polic-
ing is, for the most part, based on client complaints, 259 and cli-
ents generally do not take their attorneys, managers and agents
to court unless they are dissatisfied with the services they are
receiving.
The drawbacks of inattention to the applicable rules should
be obvious. By ignoring the well-intentioned, albeit overly re-
strictive, protective governance of the state legislatures and bar
associations, the attorney is abandoning the obligations he as-
sumed on entering the legal profession. The attorney will be
considered to be in breach of his duty to uphold the purposes of
the bench and bar. The legal system is premised on individual
maintenance of integrity and improving the competence of the
bar. Meeting these standards is considered to be the ethical re-
sponsibility of every lawyer.26 °
B. Change the Rules Governing the Secondary Occupation
Industry
As currently drafted, the rules and regulations governing the
various types of personal representatives impose inconsistent
standards. These differences create conflict among an artist's
various representatives, rather than encouraging adequate pro-
tection of artists' interests. Changes in the rules governing an
attorney's secondary occupation would thus enhance the attor-
ney's ability to function effectively in the entertainment
industry.
1. Enact uniform legislation imposing fiduciary
standards on all artists' personal representatives.
Many of the conflicts facing attorneys acting in dual capaci-
ties stem from the fact that attorneys are held to a fiduciary
duty which exceeds that required of talent agents and personal
258. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46, 202 and accompanying text (New
York); notes 163-64 and accompanying text (California); notes 206-11 (franchising
requirement).
259. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; see also Kang & Finefrock, supra
note 251.
260. CODE, supra note 16, EC 1-1, 1-5.
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managers.26' One solution to this inconsistency would be to
identify and define a common fiduciary standard applicable to
all personal representatives. "This standard should be promul-
gated with the primary purpose of protecting the artist. ' 262 The
standard enacted should be similar to the current fiduciary
duty required of attorneys. By synthesizing the standards of
required conduct for talent agents and those of attorney-client
relationships, additional laws "could be written which would
prevent overreaching contracts, unfair business practices and
conflict relationships between personal managers and art-
ists," 2 6 3 or talent agents and artists. By extending such a stan-
dard to all personal representatives, it is possible that all
"loopholes" could be filled, creating uniform standards suffi-
cient to protect any artist regardless of his choice of
specialist.264
2. License personal managers and specifically delineate
the separate roles of personal representatives.
Part of the problem facing personal representatives is that
the exact functions of each representative are not clear, and
services rendered to artists overlap. Requiring that personal
managers be licensed under a licensing scheme which expressly
describes the different tasks of talent agents and personal man-
agers could eliminate the overlap. This would provide clearer
guidelines for each representative to follow. Numerous indi-
viduals in the entertainment industry have proposed a licensing
scheme for personal managers.265 This suggestion has been
constantly criticized by personal managers2 6 who seem to be-
lieve that licensing of both talent agents and personal managers
would create a duplication of duties and overreaching regula-
tion.267 However, since most of the criticism comes from the
managers themselves, it may actually stem from the desire to
perform representative functions without the burden of acquir-
ing a license. If the concern with duplication and overreaching
is meritorious, specific delineation of duties would ameliorate
duplication. On balance, as this commentary has illustrated,
261. See generally Jossen, supra note 4.
262. Id. at 120.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Note, supra note 28, at 363; see also generally Hearings, supra note 28.




regulation and guidance in this area is necessary, rather than
overreaching.
3. Create an incidental booking exemption for California
attorneys.
In New York, the Theatrical Employment Agencies law ex-
cludes from regulation those individuals who only incidentally
procure employment for artists.268 If California were to enact
similar legislation attorneys could operate in the entertainment
industry without being encumbered by having to acquire an ad-
ditional license if they are only involved incidentally in acquir-
ing employment for their clients as part of contract
negotiations. Such an exception already exists for California
attorneys under the California Athlete Agents Act.269 This ex-
ception reflects the acknowledgement by the sports industry
and the California legislature that attorneys are already held to
a higher fiduciary duty than agents, and that licensing is there-
fore a duplication of existing regulation. °
4. Exempt attorneys from the guild franchising
provisions.
The regulation of the personal manager-lawyer by guilds is
extremely rigid and provides unnecessary protection. This re-
sults from the primary entertainment unions' vigorous protec-
tion of their artist-members.2  Since an attorney already has a
well-defined fiduciary duty,272 he is already mandated to pro-
tect his clients' interests. Therefore, an exemption from formal
franchising for an attorney-agent should not be viewed as in-
consistent with the entertainment unions' protective function.
Also, since an attorney is required to keep his or her fees rea-
273 unosonable, any union fear of exorbitant fees is most likely
unfounded. 4
268. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
269. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b) (West Supp. 1984) (stating that "'athlete agency'
does not include any member of the State Bar of California when acting as legal coun-
sel for any person").
270. See supra note 117, at 1018.
271. Id. See also Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 412.
272. See generally Levy & Sprague, supra note 29; Kutak, A Commitment to Cli-
ents and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804 (1982).
273. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. Even though the ABA rarely
enforces most disciplinary rules, it does enforce rules involving fees, since clients are
more apt to complain about their pocketbooks than about other violations.
274. Union regulation of fees via franchising of personal representatives seems to
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5. Require uniform fee provisions for agents, managers
and attorneys operating as personal
representative for an artist.
New York and many guilds already designate fee ceilings for
talent agents. Standards should be set for personal managers
as well. In addition, provisions should be established to account
for the added services a personal representative may be per-
forming if he operates in more than one capacity. 6 Although
this latter change might not be of substantial benefit for an at-
torney since he would still be held to a standard of reasonable-
ness with respect to fee setting,277 it may enable him to argue
that the trade practice justifies the fees charged. 8
C. Change the ABA Rules Governing the Attorney
The most restrictive regulations affecting attorneys seeking
to engage in multiple occupations are promulgated by the ABA.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is adverse to dual occu-
pations.2 79 The ABA's failure to recognize the increasing occur-
rence of dual professions causes unnecessary encumbrances for
an attorney-agent and an attorney-manager. This could be
remedied in two ways.
be rather inconsistent. Since the only representative subject to the franchise require-
ment is the talent agent and not the personal manager (who charges far more for his
services) it is questionable whether a fear of "exorbitant fees" is the true reason for
franchising. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
276. This could be done similarly to the AFM "'personal management agreement'
[whereby] ... [a] talent agent franchisee-personal manager may receive an additional
five percent [above the usual ten to twenty percent] of the gross income earned by the
musician if the talent agent franchisee-personal manager agrees to also advise and
counsel the artist in various areas." Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 415. Perhaps
such a uniform fee schedule could provide for a base of fifteen percent of gross income
for providing a sole service (e.g. talent agent), with additional increments of five per-
cent for each additional service performed. For example, a representative performing
talent agent, personal management and legal service would receive a total of twenty-
five percent of an artist's gross income.
277. See supra notes 87, 142-44 and accompanying text.
278. DR 2-106, supra note 87, states that one of the factors to be considered as a
guide for determining the reasonableness of a fee is "[t]he fee customarily charged in
the locality for similar legal services." DR 2-106(B)(3), supra note 87.
279. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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1. Explicit recognition of secondary occupations with a
possible change in the standard for the secondary
occupation.
The professional responsibility rules currently dictate that an
attorney must conduct all legally related and non-related
28 0
business under directives governing attorney conduct. By ex-
plicitly recognizing that an attorney may engage in a secondary
occupation, and exempting an attorney from ABA rules in the
practice of that occupation, the attorney would be able to prac-
tice his non-legal functions more freely. Thus, the attorney-
agent and attorney-manager would only have to follow state
and guild regulations while he acts as a non-legal personal
representative.
2. Relax specific prohibitions that restrict the manner of
practice.
If certain prohibitions regarding attorney conduct were re-
laxed, the high standards imposed on an attorney in his secon-
dary occupation could be maintained while still allowing the
attorney some flexibility in his practice as an agent or manager.
This would resemble an incidental exemption as to specific
non-legal conduct. For example, if the ABA were to relax its
prohibitions against solicitation, the lawyer-agent could com-
pete for clients with non-attorney agents.281 These prohibitions
could be eased by changing the emphasis on attorney practice
from a transactional focus to a client focus by allowing an attor-
ney to perform all of the services a given client would need. It
is illogical to force an attorney to turn away clients from his
legal practice merely because they first learned of his expertise
through his other services.28 2 If the attorney has established a
professional relationship with an artist and understands the
artist's dealings within the entertainment industry, it is possi-
ble that the level of knowledge attained from that relationship
could enhance the legal services provided.
280. See supra notes 88-89 & 107 and accompanying text.
281. This suggestion was proffered in Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in
Professional and Amateur Sports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for
Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 815, 842, as "[a] promising solution to the problems
[of solicitation] created by dishonest and incompetent agents [that would] allow law-
yer-agents to compete for clients with non-lawyer agents."





The attorney operating in a secondary occupation has been
virtually ignored by the ABA. As a result, none of the regula-
tions, rules, or laws governing attorney conduct attempt to ac-
commodate dual occupation arrangements. Such an
accommodation may benefit the general public and artists, who
depend on the loyalty and protection offered by a personal rep-
resentative in an otherwise confusing and complex work place.
This commentary recognizes that by entering into the legal
profession, an attorney willingly accepts the ABA guidelines
which define his practice. Historically, the ethical considera-
tions imposed on attorneys have helped make the legal profes-
sion the unique and respected profession it is. However, the
time has come when traditional practices need to become more
flexible.
In view of both the value and the dangers inherent in engag-
ing in a secondary occupation, this commentary proposes
changes to alleviate the potential conflicts faced by the attor-
ney-manager.283 Such changes are necessary if attorneys in the
entertainment industry are to contribute their full range of
skills and services to the business.
As the entertainment industry exists today, standards for the
various representatives often conflict 284 and enforcement of the
regulations is minimal.285 Imposing a uniform fiduciary duty
on any personal representative 286 combined with an explicit
recognition of secondary occupations by the ABA287 should be
the first step towards change. These proposals may be seen as
far reaching and may be the most difficult to implement. How-
ever, they would be the most beneficial solutions because they
focus directly on the needs of artists and attorneys. The pro-
posals would easily create the change needed by attorneys who
practice in dual occupations, while maintaining necessary artist
protection. These proposals are eventually a compromise be-
tween existing practices. By raising the fiduciary standard of
personal managers and reducing the restrictions faced by attor-
283. See supra text accompanying notes 252-82.
284. See supra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. See also notes 180-90 and ac-
companying text.
286. See supra, text accompanying notes 261-64.
287. See supra text accompanying note 280.
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neys, parity could be reached, with all representatives owing a
similar fiduciary duty to the artist. 8
Once these proposed standards are enacted, many of the
other suggestions could be easily adopted. For example, any
legislation mandating a fiduciary duty could clarify the "gray
areas" by delineating the specific functions of each representa-
tive.2 9 The next logical step would be to enact uniform fee pro-
visions,290  relax specific prohibitions for attorneys, 291 and
restructure union franchising provisions.292
Successful implementation of these changes will require the
concerted effort of all interested parties within the entertain-
ment indistry, legislature and bar. If change is not forthcom-
ing, attorneys may choose to ignore regulations, and base
decisions regarding artist representation on convenience and
fear of client dissatisfaction, rather than on client protection.
To avoid this scenario, the dual occupation of attorney-manager
and attorney-agent should be recognized and closely examined
by the ABA, the legislature and pertinent entertainment indus-
try entities.
288. Johnson & Lang, supra note 42, at 425 n.237 ("Personal managers should be
held to the same standard as agents or trustees."); but cf. Jossen, supra note 4, at 117
(the author feels that holding personal managers to the standard of an agent is "inade-
quate for sufficient protection of artists' interests [and is] ... inequitable since attor-
neys are held to a higher fiduciary duty than agents .. "). It appears that Jossen is
using the generic term of agent, rather than talent agents as set out in the Labor
Code, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1986). If new legislation is enacted to
prescribe a fiduciary duty for all personal representatives, the degree of such duty
could also be prescribed.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 265-67.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 275-78
291. See supra text accompanying notes 281-82.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 271-74. The suggestion discussed at text
accompanying notes 271-74, supra, focused on an exemption from franchising for at-
torneys. If legislation were enacted mandating a uniform fiduciary duty regulating all
personal representatives, the unions might want to reexamine their entire franchising
provisions to reevaluate who should be franchised and how that should be
accomplished.
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